Closing the Credibility Gap

Why Act’s race-based welfare statistics are worthless

Listener: 7 February, 2004.

Keywords: Maori; Statistics;

Early in January the Act Party released a paper that calculated the tax collected from Maori was $2.3 billion a year, while government spending on Maori was $7.3 billion a year. Whatever the factual situation –– below I suggest that the figures are misleading –– different political flavours will draw different conclusions.

Racists may surmise that the gap shows Maori are not pulling their weight. Demographers will say that the Maori population is younger than average and children don’t pay tax. Welfarists might say that Maori are poorer and the fiscal system is (mildly) redistributive. Act argues that the data proves the current policies are not working. That lacks logic, since the gap may have been larger a decade ago. In any case, the data certainly does not prove that Act’s alternative policies will work, any more than the Rogernomes drawing attention to poor economic performance meant their policies worked. (They made things worse.)

However, Act got the figures wrong. I do not receive the generous state subsidies for such investigations that the Act parliamentary research unit does, but even a couple of hours on a Sunday afternoon (I should’ve been at the beach) showed that their figures are riddled with problems, and probably overstate the gap. Fortunately, the paper that Act released is sufficiently explicit to be able to trace the errors. To be fair to the unit, this is the work of amateurs, not crooks. Perhaps the major mistake is that they have grossly underestimated the tax paid by Maori, using 2000/01 March year data as if it applied to the 2002/03 June year, they didn’t bother to reconcile the data base they used (self-reported incomes) with more precise estimates of recorded income, and they omitted over one-third of the tax base.

Suppose that we were to apply exactly the same method to non-Maori. According to the Act method, the rest of the country pays about $23.4b while benefiting from $34.5b of government spending, again being in a major deficit. Who is covering the deficit (and contributing to the budget surplus)? The nonsense arises because the Act calculations ignore over $14b of taxation.

I leave others to ask what the credibility of Act’s economics policy is when the party loses $14b of tax revenue. Instead, I want to illustrate this as typical of an amateurism endemic throughout the public debate.

The first rule in professional research is know your literature. Early New Zealand exponents of the fiscal incidence research included Cornelis Weststrate, Wolf Rosenberg and Les Castle. Suzanne Snively made enormous progress in the 1980s, leading to Statistics New Zealand’s The Fiscal Incidence on Income Distribution 1987/88 published in 1990. More recently, Ron Crawford updated that study for the Treasury. Not to know the literature is to repeat past mistakes. Even the Treasury, I am afraid, makes them. Professional researchers have been appalled by just how wasteful some of its work has been because it does not know the territory. (Not Crawford’s, though.)

The Act research unit extended the standard work to fiscal incidence by ethnicity, following some equally literature-blind work by the NZIER. Ethnic data requires great care, because definitions jump around from database to database. The Act report does not discuss this problem, so I don’t know if it is sensitive to it. A professional would not dare publish work on one ethnic group without checking the method worked on others.

There is no indication that the Act report went to independent referees. (The NZIER uses internal referees, and the Treasury often uses overseas ones who know little about the New Zealand context. Better than nothing, but neither strategy is ideal. Instead, hire independent competent New Zealand referees.) The professional has the advantage of experience. Is the result consistent with past research findings? If it is not, what assumptions generate the un-usual outcome? (The smell test told me there was something wrong with the Act data. Although it is likely that there is a gap, the reported size suggested a miscalculation.)

None of this is rocket science. Yet, far too much New Zealand economic (and other social science) research ignores the elementary. A Gresham’s law predicts the debasing of research quality under commercialisation. In the 1970s and early 80s, the social science professions struggled against it. But Rogernomes, having little respect for intellectual quality inconsistent with their ideology, penalised those who identified the flaws in their approach, the struggle collapsed, and we end up with shallow meaningless “research” such as that released by Act.

1999 and All That

Strange as it seems, Helen Clark and Michael Cullen may be revolutionaries.
Listener: 24 January, 2004.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

The standard New Zealand histories cite 1890, with the election of the first Liberal government, and 1935, with the first Labour government, as years of “revolution” –– albeit constitutional and evolving ones –– when the economy and society took on a new direction. So much so that the Reform government came to power in 1912 and the National government in 1949 primarily as consolidators rather than reversers.

But how are we to evaluate 1984? Although many would call it a “counter-revolution”, it is more complicated. As this column had been arguing, the time had arrived to change some of the central economic mechanisms. The economic diversification and the increasing social differentiation of the 1970s (reflecting affluence and aspiration rather than increasing social inequality) meant that the highly intervened and largely inward-looking economy had to be redirected towards a more market and open course. (My writings did, however, underplay the new technologies that pointed the same way.) Regrettably, Rob Muldoon’s government from 1975 tended to be backward-looking, delaying the required changes, so there was a need for major reform when it lost power in 1984.

But the incoming Labour government over-reacted with unnecessarily extremist policies, so much so that some markedly damaged the economic performance. Today, there are widespread calls for New Zealand to return to the top half of the OECD (measured by GDP per capita). What the advocates do not mention is that New Zealand was last there in 1985, and the policies they now demand were among those associated with the subsequent decline. (What did they do in the 1980s and 1990s to resist the policies that led to our falling out of the top half of the OECD?)

Roger Kerr, director of the Business Roundtable, quotes Prime Minister Helen Clark as saying that the 1990s were wasted years. He says the last decade has been a success. Clark, the epitome of orthodoxy, defines the 1990s in the usual way from 1990 to 1999, when economic growth averaged 2.6 percent pa –– below the OECD growth rate. Kerr, cavalier with definitions, replaces the first three dreadful years of the 1990s by years from 2000, and the growth goes up to 3.7 percent for 1993-2002. Clark and Kerr must agree that the Michael Cullen period has been much better than the Ruth Richardson one.

The reason, I think, is that the Clark/Cullen administration has abandoned the extremism of the Rogernomes –– indeed, it has reversed some of the loonier policies –– while sticking to the principles of a more market and open economy. So 1984 was a failed revolution. In 1999, Labour was given a second chance.

Will history record 1999 as a year of revolution? The previous ones were associated with periods of long political stability. (The Liberals were in power for 21 years, and Labour first for 14.) The political stability seems to have been associated with strong economic growth. Post-1999 economic growth has been above the OECD average. However, the economy faces the same danger as it did in the 1980s, when the exchange rate was allowed to rise, stifling the external engine of growth. The Rogernomes did not care then –– and the economy stagnated. This time the government sees the threat.

There are other challenges the government faces as it beds in. The first is arrogance, a natural state for any re-elected government, but compounded by the increasingly intimate relationships between politicians and their official advisers. That is no bad thing, until the politicians forget their constituents, for the Wellington-based advisers have little empathy with the public at large. A number of last year’s announced policies were followed by public outrage and a government backdown. Too many such incidents can cripple a government’s authority.

The government has still to get on with the business sector. The Rogernomics of the 1980s and 1990s gave business an almost unlimited licence. This government knows business is crucial to its economic strategy, but that is only a part of a wider social and cultural vision. On occasions, it has suppressed economic priorities for wider ones. Business has still not always understood this. Of course, it will show outrage when it is thwarted, but currently it is the outrage of crass stupidity rather than of a shrewdness that acknowledges the wider concerns, but insists that the economics must be taken into account. Meanwhile, the government is as uncomfortable with business.

And there is race relations ……

Writing 150 years after the French Revolution, historian G M Trevelyn said it was still too soon to tell its significance. That caution applies to any assessment of this government. But the prospect of 1999 being considered a year of revolution remains. I don’t think history will see 1984 as such a year.

Will You Look at That

Fact: New Zealand has a national portrait gallery. Not many people know that.
Listener: 17 January, 2004.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

You would hardly know that New Zealand has a national portrait gallery, hidden on the busy corner of Wellington’s Bowen St and Lambton Quay in the debating chamber used when Parliament House was being refurbished. The local bookseller tells me that he constantly has to point the way.

We do not seem to be a nation of portraiture –– just snaps. The camera has existed for almost the whole of European settlement, so we have pictures of almost everyone (early Maori excluded). The tradition of formal oil painting remains, but we are so earnest that we lack those wonderfully satirical studies scattered through the Australian National Portrait Gallery (also, coincidentally, housed in a past Parliament building).

Instead, our gallery focuses on themes. The current one is of scientists. Passing the copy of Joshua Reynold’s painting of Joseph Banks, through a gallery of the science interpreters –– journalists, writers, film and television –– the central chamber displays 10 scientists who explored and recorded our natural heritage, setting up some of our key scientific institutions. They include James Hector (Dominion Museum), Leonard Cockayne (conserving and regenerating the native bush), Thomas Cheeseman (Auckland Museum), Frederick Hutton (geology and zoology), Charles Chilton (crustacea, including crabs and crayfish), John Holloway (a clergyman who studied mosses), Robert Falla (birds and conservation), Charles Fleming (birds and conservation) and Trevor Hatherton (leader of our scientific team in the Antarctic).

The official portraits tend to be formal, even pious. Fleming, however, is shown informally sitting on a rocky outcrop in his shorts; it better captures the man, and –– in truth –– the fun that was also in their professions, as well as the hard grind and intellectual challenge. But a good photograph is worth a thousand snaps: in some ways, the accompanying photographs and memorabilia that supplement the paintings better illustrate the kind of lives the scientists led, the people they were and the passions they pursued.

Ironically, the two women in the exhibition –– Lucy Moore, the “mother of New Zealand botany”, and Margot Forde –– do not have formal portraits, only photographs, although each is worthy of one (but not too pious, please). I took considerable pleasure in the Forde story, for her father was Bernard Ashwin, who as secretary of the Treasury is one of our greatest public servants. When I wrote of him in my book The Nationbuilders, I had no sense of the significance of his eldest daughter, who established a seed bank that, in some instances, is the entire world community –– the store of last resort of the Australasian grasslands. She is commemorated by the Margot Forde Arboretum and the Margot Forde Forage Germplasm Centre, an international resource containing 70,000 seed samples of 1600 different forage species. (More substantial memorials than anything for her economist father.)

When writing The Nationbuilders, I looked for a suitable scientist to tell that part of our history. I should have collected together a number of them in the way the Portrait Gallery does, for they built the nation, too, by studying, recording, preserving and protecting our environmental heritage.

It would be great to go around the exhibition with adolescents with a scientific inclination, who would be inspired by the portrayed lives –– and who could join the rest of us who feel awe at their achievements, and know that the nation is in part what it is because of the people portrayed here.

Alas, there were few –– young or old –– there when I visited the gallery. It’s an exhibition noble in concept, well-executed, exciting and inspiring –– and poorly publicised. Bit like nationbuilding, really.

A Blooming Future: Are We Up to a Good Flower Show?

Listener 10 January, 2004.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade; Growth & Innovation;

The Netherlands produces annually about $9 billion of flowers and related products, of which it exports almost $8 billion (and imports and exports another billion). In contrast, New Zealand exports a paltry $70m. The difference is all the more astonishing because Michael Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations argues that the Dutch have no comparative advantage in the growing of flowers. Rather, they have built up a technological excellence and maintain a quality edge at the forefront of world production and distribution.

Each year 125,000 tourists visit the largest trade centre in the world –– it covers 165 football pitches –– at Aalsmer, on the edge of Amsterdam, which auctions and distributes flowers. The blooms come from all over the world –– even Australia sends roses –– and they go on to many other countries, notably Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States. (Flowers fly in from Africa and fly on to the US.)

And yes, they use a “Dutch auction system”, where the price descends until someone bids. Casually dressed buyers seated in tiers look at a big “clock” on the front wall that starts at a price of 100 (euros a bunch) and falls rapidly until someone pushes their button for a sale. The buyers were men. I saw only three women, although all the technicians testing flower quality were female. The auction halls may be becoming obsolete, with offsite electronic sales rising, because the buyers hardly look at the flowers, instead relying on the reputation of the 7000-odd producers and the quality control by the central auction house. The cavernous space below, with its rattling trolleys of racks of flowers (130,000 of them), will be there longer, as bunches-in are repackaged to bunches-out. Perhaps the trade will shift to warehouses around the world one day, too, as quality testing is decentralised. (It requires roses –– their largest-selling flower, ahead of tulips and chrysanthemums –– to last at least eight days after they are sold.)

Is there a future for a serious flower industry in New Zealand –– say one that exports a billion dollars a year? Are our businesses too small? The typical Aalsmer supplier provides over 3000 flowers and plants every working day. Quality, too, is a problem. Some of the wretched specimens that straggle outside our corner dairies are no promise of a Dutch-quality industry. Pressures from the domestic market can be the foundation of exporting. Wine exports got under way when we gave up drinking sweet sherry.

In the 1960s we deliberately allowed imports of foreign cheeses to create a domestic market from which we could export specialist cheeses. Are there new flowers to send overseas? Kowhai and the rata and pohutukawa are promising local spectaculars. And the gloriously flowering manuka hillsides over the new year –– as close as we get to a white Christmas. Have we the research programme to turn the natives into sustainable commercial products? Perhaps the “next kiwifruit” is not an edible but a lookable.

But it is not just a research and production problem. Florafed, the industry organisation, lacks funds after a compulsory levy was rejected by growers. All today’s big primary exporters started off with producer boards or as some sort of monopoly. How is the industry going to get a collective agency that will lead the export way? Recall how big the typical Dutch export grower is.

The defeatists say that we are too far away from world markets. But the Dutch hardly send anything to Japan, and their US flowers go to the East Coast. Our market is the Pacific Basin. And although a typical European country spends over $80 a head on flowers each year, the Americans spend less than $60. That is a market with $5b waiting to be developed. Florafed says that New Zealanders purchase about $18 per head per year, although the figure may not be comparable. Heck, blokes, we buy only a couple of bunches a year?

To open up the Pacific markets we need better air freight. We may have to abandon the reliance on the aircraft holds under our tourists –– they won’t always go to where we want to send the flowers –– and develop a bulk goods air infrastructure.

What about China’s threat to enter the world flower market? It is real enough, but surely insufficient to undermine New Zealand’s prospects. We have a competitive advantage in being out of the northern hemisphere season –– and the sun is cheaper than heating glasshouses. Additionally, as the Dutch show, the international trade in flowers is not a commodity business. Developing new species and focusing on quality products is not easy –– but it will be easier for more skilled New Zealanders than for the Chinese. That is the point of competitive advantage. The value comes from being technologically advanced and technologically advancing.

Towards an Analytic Framework for Globalisation

The Political Economy of the Diminishing Tyranny of Distance.

Accepted for publication by The Journal of Economic and Social Policy (January 2004: the original version was submitted in September 2002).

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Abstract Globalisation can be treated as a consequence of the falling costs of distance, and its problems as arising from different sorts of distances reducing at different rates. The paper is written from the perspective of Australasia, which has suffered more and benefited more from the ‘tyranny of distance’, and will be ultimately impacted more by its falling costs.[1]

Introduction

In Geoffrey Blainey’s memorable phrase ‘the tyranny of distance’ shaped Australia (Blainey 1966). He could have added New Zealand, for while internal distances were not nearly as great – although further than the map portrays, given the ruggedness of the country – it might claim to be even further from the rest of the world. But if isolation was a defining feature of Australasia’s early history, the distance – measured in resource costs – has been since diminishing.

The magnitudes of these reductions are astonishing. One hundred and fifty years ago it took at least three months to sail from Australasia to Britain. That applied for goods, passengers and mail. Today it takes about three weeks, so the distance has effectively decreased by three quarters for many goods. If the goods are high value for weight, or it is people who are travelling, the effective distance is even closer, since the flight to Europe is about a day – a 98 percent reduction. Today’s information moves even faster, zipping around the world in microseconds and almost costlessly: a nineteenth century equivalent might be the line of sight.

The falling costs of distance have been crucial to the evolution of the two countries. Until the 1880s the effective distance for transporting fresh meat to Britain was near enough to infinite. Refrigeration, coupled with steamships and telegraph, reduced that distance cost to a fraction of meat production costs. The very existence of pastoral New Zealand and those parts of Australia which developed around meat and dairying are due to these falling costs.

But as Blainey rightly argues, as costs come down the nature of the two countries will change. How to think about this systematically? This paper will argue that we can use the standard economists’ theory of international trade, which actually provides more interesting insights than its application to tariffs. Trade models usually look at only questions of before and after full protection. However the costs of distance fall for different products and services at different rates, so the results from trade models with partial reductions in some tariffs are relevant. They have not attracted economists’ attention as much because the conclusions do not have the elegance of the zero tariff application.

The analytic transposition is to treat the costs of distance as if it were a tariff, and a reduction in the costs of distance as if it was a bilateral reduction in tariff levels between the two destinations. There are differences, but they do not seem important.

A curiosity of economics is how little attention economists usually give to transport costs. For instance, the major US international trade text by Krugman and Obstfeld (2002) devotes just over a page to transport costs in 750 pages, all the more surprising because Krugman was a pioneer on the theory of intra-industry trade (discussed below) which is so dependent on low and falling transport costs and the revival of economic geography. This is partly because the United States has not been tyrannised by distance in the same way Australasia has been – although it has been influential – but it also reflects the inherent policy interest in tariffs and other forms of border protection. Economists’ passion for policy questions has obscured the relevance of policy-exogenous productivity changes, which in the long run may have a greater impact on output, growth, and welfare than the policies economists focus on. The history of the world economy is much more about reducing costs of distance than it is of lower tariffs.

While the introduction of this paper focussed on the peculiarities of the Australasian experience, much of this analysis applies to the whole world. Indeed we might analyse globalisation as the consequences of the reductions in the costs of distance. The term ‘costs of distance’ is wider than transport costs, also encompassing inventory and additional production costs, the costs of time, and reliability and security, and the difficulties of responding to changing circumstances in markets distant from headquarters. All of these have changed substantially over the years, and usually they have diminished.

Defining Globalisation

The definition of globalisation is problematic. Many writers avoid defining it analytically, instead characterising it by a series of particular phenomenon such as increasing trade, or capital flows, or logos, or international inequality; or to particular international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank or the European Union, or multinational corporations; or to particular policies such as free trade, liberalised capital movements, and so on. The London Economist described globalisation as ‘international capitalism’: many anti-globalisers might agree, perhaps adding ‘together with US hegemony’.

Stanley Fischer, one-time chief economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), describes globalisation as ‘the ongoing process of greater interdependence among countries and their citizens’ (2003, p. 2). Joseph Stiglitz, who held a similar position at the World Bank, defines globalisation as ‘the closer integration of countries of the world as a result of lowering transportation and communication costs, and the removal of artificial man-made barriers.’ (2003, p. x). Both are focussed on contemporary phenomenon. Nineteenth century globalisation was also about the integration of regions which created modern nation states. Stiglitz also mixes a phenomenon and a mechanism. As already mentioned, this paper agrees that reductions in the costs of distance, more widely defined than by Stiglitz, had a central role. But in contrast, the approach here is to see the removal of man-made barriers as responses to the opportunities that the reductions in the costs of distance make.

This last point illustrates the weakness of the Stiglitz definition, because others may wish to discuss the same general phenomenon, but to argue for a different causal process. In the end a simple phenomenon based definition like Fischer’s, may be the most fruitful. We follow Stiglitz, albeit also covering the nineteenth century, with globalisation is the closer integration of nations and regions.

Even so, this paper agrees with Stiglitz that reductions in the costs of distance provide a foundation for an analytic understanding of globalisation. Of course the term ‘consequences’ leaves a lot of analysis to be developed. Nor is it entirely clear that the costs of distance can be treated quite as exogenously as the analysis to be developed here assumes. Technical change and the implementation of its applications is influenced by the political economy and it is possible that globalisation biases the change in a particular direction, while it seems likely that it is also influential on the rate of introduction and dissemination. In the interim, let us get the analysis underway, and a feedback loop to make the falling costs of distance partially dependent on the political economy of globalisation can be added if required.

One merit of this approach is that it provides a framework which incorporates the scholarly literature which treats globalisation as a nineteenth century phenomenon, as well as a late twentieth century one. Some even argue that globalisation was then a more powerful force than it is today, partly because labour – European labour anyway – was more freely mobile. Their accounts of globalisation make frequent reference to distance: how in the nineteenth century railways, steamships, telegraph and a host of other technological changes, made the world smaller, increasing the flows of labour, capital goods and technology. A not unexpected outcome was an increasing convergence of prices of goods and returns to factors in different locations. As transport costs fell, the price levels of transportable goods in different locations became more similar. The correlation between them also increased, indicating that the regional markets were integrating (O’Rourke & Williamson 1999).

The Standard Model: Costs of Distance as an Analogue of a Tariff

The standard general equilibrium neo-classical model of an economy used by most economists, which underpins trade theory, involves a number of economic actors who have a certain amount of labour and capital resources and production technologies available to them. In its simplest static form the model concludes that if each actor uses their resources to maximise their own ends, the ‘efficient’ outcome will be a market equilibrium in which prices equate to the relative marginal utilities of consumption and the relative marginal costs of production. The equilibrium is ‘Pareto’ efficient insofar as one actor’s welfare can only be improved at the expense of reducing (at least) one other’s. In summary, a market system generates a Pareto optimum if it is allowed to operate without interventions. But, of course, the theorem requires a number of key assumptions to be valid, some of the most important of which are explored below.

A crucial, if policy limiting, generalisation of this analysis was identified by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). Their pseudonymous theorem, also know as, ‘the general theory of the second best’, says that if something prevents equality between marginal cost and marginal utility in one market, it may not be optimal to apply pure market solutions in the rest of the economy. The theorem does not have any policy conclusion which can be simply advocated, for despite a lot of theoretical effort it has not normally been possible to get any clear cut applications.

There is an extraordinary exception. Suppose an economy is split into two (or more) parts between which the factors are prohibited from migrating. That would mean the same factor could be paid at different rates in the different parts of the economy. That is the sort of restriction on factor mobility the second best theorem appears pessimistic about. Yet there is a very well established theoretical conclusion, that under some particular assumptions both parts of the economy benefit from free trade in goods and services between them. Treating the parts as of a world economy – that there is factor immobility between countries – the policy prescription is that free trade gives the optimal outcome for both countries (caveats to be added). In particular, tariffs or other protective devices reduce the welfare of the inhabitants of both countries and the elimination of this protection raises welfare in both countries. In the swamp of second best analysis the free trade result is extraordinary, and possibly unique, for the clarity of its conclusions, even if they are heavily dependent upon other assumptions which may not reflect actual circumstances (Krugman & Obstfeld 2000).

It might seem then that a reduction in the costs of distance, analogous to a reduction in a tariff which moves the economies closer to the pure free trading position, ought to be a benefit. Why then is there so much dissent? We skip over the assumption of rapid redeployment of released resources which concerns anti-globalisers, merely noting that, as in the case of all economic shocks, there is an adaption problem and those required to adapt most greatly usually suffer in the process.

Economies of Scale

‘Economies of scale’ matter. They may exist for a particular production process, for an industry, or for an economy as a whole. The optimality of free trade – indeed of every market solution – may fail if economies of scale exist to any significant practical extent.

Recent developments in trade theory suggest that a world of significant economies of scale has multiple equilibria, unlike that which occurs in standard international trade theory (Gomory & Baumol 2000). New Trade Theory is not some interesting theoretical blind alley. Rather it responds to a growing anomaly in the old trade theory, which predicts inter-industry trade but has little explanatory power on the causes of intra-industry trade, where two countries trade the same products, rather than each specialising in different products (Helpman & Krugman 1985).

New Trade Theory emphasises the role of economies of scale (together with specialisation of products). But they are not reaped if the costs of distance are onerous. The effect of transport and other distance costs protect smaller scale producers from being undercut by larger producers reaping the lower costs of economies of scale. As distance costs fall, the smaller producers lose this natural protection, and production gets concentrated in fewer locations. Growing intra-industry trade is thus a response to reductions in the costs of distance.

The exact configuration of the resulting economies – which firms or industries locate where – may be the result of history or accident. (Or even – anti-globalisers might emphasise this – the result of political or military outcomes.) Most of the theoretical analyses involve models with two countries of similar size, so how a small country functions and what options it has is unclear. However the experience of Nokia in Finland suggests that small countries may possess large manufacturing businesses with strong economies of scale, although it is less clear how such activities may be fostered.

Intra-industry trade represents a challenge to the standard approach to international trade which has underpinned Australasian international trading policy. That comes from the Ricardian notion of trade based upon ‘comparative advantage’ in which countries exchange different products. In particular, Australasia had the ‘peripheral’ (or colonial) role in the world economy of exporting primary commodities (such as minerals, wool, grain, dairy products, and meat) to ‘central’ (or imperial) economies, and importing their manufactures.

Whatever the merits of this strategy it is becoming obsolete. Intra-industry trade, based on ‘competitive advantage’, is the rapidly growing component of world trade, now making up a quarter of traded goods. (As a rough rule today a quarter is oil, a quarter is other primary commodities, a quarter is manufactures traded on a comparative advantage basis, with the remaining intra-industry quarter growing the more rapidly)

Yet Australasia – like many other developing countries – is trapped in the comparative advantage trading relations. The only ‘mature’ intra-industry trading relation New Zealand has is with Australia – and conversely (Bano 2002; Easton 1997, pp.144-7).[2] While the comparative advantage strategy of supplying primary commodities to the world fostered both countries in the past, their role in international trade is limited (not least because of international protection and other interventions by centre economies), while dependence on them limits the internal development of each nation.

Differential Diminishing of Distance

Additionally, the free trade theorem does not say that a reduction in a tariff rate necessarily increases economic welfare. That gain only certainly occurs (subject to the various assumptions) when all border protection is eliminated. James Meade finishes his chapter on the second best options under a partial freeing of trade with the gloomy ‘it is very difficult to reach any general conclusions on the subject’ (Meade 1955, pp. 224-5). The parallel is that it seems likely that a reduction in the costs of distance may not be necessarily beneficial to an economy, if the other costs of distance do not reduce.

Just as we cannot be sure that a partial reduction in tariffs are a benefit, we cannot be sure that a partial reduction in the costs of distance will be beneficial either. While this is analytically disappointing, there is some comfort because the conclusion provides a rigorous underpinning to the problem of globalisation: if globalisation is the consequence of reductions in the costs of distance, the problem of globalisation arises because distances diminish at different rates for different products and for different places. If all costs of distances were to diminish in the same proportion – if the world were just to shrink – then most globalisation problems would be much less important. But the world has shrunk more for information than for individual travel, and more for travel than for goods, and least for the complex networks which make up our human cultures. The second best theorems suggest that the reduction in some of the costs of distance need not be of benefit – at least initially.

Even so, we need to be cautious rather than pessimistic. The modelling issue is complicated by reductions in the costs of distance and involves simultaneous tariff-type reductions by both parties. For instance, while the inbound tourist industry has benefited from the ease with which tourists may come here, the same domestic industry suffers from it also being cheaper for Australasians to go overseas. On the other hand, we know that a reduction of tariffs on the inputs of a protected industry reduces welfare because resources are attracted into the inefficient industry. A similar possibility may apply for transport costs. Some of the big reductions in the costs of distance have been in telecommunications which have created possibilities such as off-location call centres, which are an industry input.

Distributional Issues

Anti-globalisers are also concerned with distributional issues and not just the production. These can be easily illustrated by considering the extreme case of an economy which moves from autarchy to total free trade. The shift moves the economy to a higher level of welfare. However, the theorem does not say that under the shift, everyone is better off (that is there is a Pareto improvement in welfare), since some specific factors will have reductions in their remuneration (even after full redeployment). An example might be that were there to be free access of Australasian foodstuffs into the United States, the US would be better off as a whole, but those US owners of foodstuffs specific capital (in the short to medium run), and foodstuffs specific land (in the long run), would be worse off.

The economic theory is straightforward. The endpoint of the shift to free trade is Pareto efficient – that is nobody can be made better off without making someone worse off – and so is the beginning point of autarchy under the model assumptions. However the theorem does not say that the shift between the two points makes everybody better off. Rather the standard analysis says that following the opening of trade, the gains are such that everyone who is worse off could be compensated back to where they were, and there would still be a surplus for some people to be better off. Anti-globalisers may say ‘that may be true, but the compensation rarely happens’.

There is a practical reason. Calculations of the gains from trade from existing protective regimes almost always suggests the gains from the total elimination of protection are small. For instance in the 1970s, when there was careful measurement on the New Zealand economy, the typical estimates suggested gains from removing what by today’s standards were onerous border protection, were less than 1 percent of GNP (Easton 1997, pp. 169-173) The implication is the gains are so small that the costs of administration would make effective compensation impractical.

(It does not necessarily follow from this that there is no case for eliminating protection. Free trade may not be not a policy strategy in itself, but a part of a wider strategy, in which the growth process in a small open economy starts in the external sector and feeds into the domestic one. Eliminating border protection may be a part of the policy mix to generate an open growth strategy. On this argument the static gains from trade are not particularly relevant.)

The anti-globalisers often make the further general point that globalisation raises the profit rate at the expense of reductions in wages, and thus the income distribution becomes less equal. This is much disputed. It is not obvious that wage earners should always be worse off under changes such as a reduction in the costs of distance. However the empirical models do suggest that while the gains from trade are small, the redistribution from the change in factor prices is a magnitude larger. It illustrates one of the most general rules in policy analysis: the impact of a policy change usually affects distribution more than it affects efficiency. (Perhaps that is why economists focus on efficiency.)

Differential Factor Mobility

Recall that the standard free trade analysis can be interpreted as a special case of the second best theorems, where there are prohibitions of movements on all factors between the two parts of the economy, or in the international trade example, between two economies. What happens if a particular labour skill is allowed to migrate, say from Australasia to Europe, because its factor return is higher in Europe than Australasia? Because they have chosen to move, the Australasians with the skill are better off, while those in Europe with the skills may experience a depression in their wages from the additional supply and be worse off. (This assumes that economies of scale are not significant.) But what about the rest of those involved?

The standard trade model can be rejigged by pretending that the Australasians migrants still live in Australasia and simply sell their labour skills in Europe. In this context the permission to migrate could be treated as the elimination of an infinite tariff on the skilled labour service. Second best theorems warn us this may not result in an improvement in world welfare. But suppose it did. It would not necessarily result in an increase in the welfare of the Australasians who did not migrate, even if there was an increase in the aggregate welfare of all Australasians, if the gains to the migrants exceed the national gains, as we have observed in other cases of the freeing of trade (Easton 2002).

The migration of labour, capital/savings and technology are all facilitated by the falling costs of distance. There is a tendency to assume that such migration is necessarily a good thing, but it is not always clear what are the assumptions that are being used to justify the conclusion.

To give some simple examples. An increase in the supply of foreign capital presumably decreases the domestic profit rate. Why then do local capitalists generally applaud capital inflows? [3] What assumptions are we making about the substitution elasticity between labour and capital if we think capital inflows benefit workers, or if – as in the case of anti-globalisers – we think the inflows are a detriment to workers? In the case of the international technology transfer, what are our underlying assumptions if we think that it is profitable to Australasia? And if we believe that technology does not conform to the private property standard rules of the market, what does that say about domestic technology policy and market strategies generally? Policy discussions often ignore such questions. What is clear from the trade issues where we have a better analytic understanding, is that often the answers require attention to second best phenomenon, to distributional impacts, and to production structures, and also possibly to factor endowments such as the quality and skills of the workforce.

Extending of the Analysis

The recognition of globalisation being driven by falling costs of distance leads to other insights, some of which are listed and developed briefly here.

New Economic Structures and Locations

Historically, agriculture and other resource based industries were located near their resources, service industries were located near their customers, and manufacturing traded off the transport costs between the resources they used, the labour and other costs available, and the markets they served. Some new technologies, especially telecommunications, which reduce the costs of distance mean that some service industries are now as footloose as manufacturing. We need to revise our notions of the nature of the economic structure and where and how it is located.

It is instructive – and consequential – that this international mobility has led to a General Agreement on Trade in Services, some fifty years after GATT (although some of the ‘services’ included in the trade are not really services).

International Regulation

Historically, nations created the institutions which regulate domestic markets as the falling costs of distance integrated their markets. (The Australian Federation for example.) International institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, are today’s global equivalents, a regulatory response to globalisation as a consequence of the falling costs of distance. Like their nineteenth century counterparts they may not be particularly just institutions. The parallel from the past suggests that the aim of anti-globalisers should be to modify them to obtain more just outcomes, rather than oppose internationally over-arching institutions.

Another example of a broadening of markets leading to cross-border regulatory mechanisms is the increasing intra-industry trade between Australia and New Zealand. Tax regimes also have to be modified as markets integrate across fiscal boundaries and factors migrate.

Endogenous Policy Responses

The cynic might argue that as capitalists found themselves increasingly bound at home, they escaped by going offshore, a phenomenon made possible by the falling costs of distance. In which case reductions of protection and the internationalisation of the regulation of markets may be treated as consequences of globalisation rather than its driver. It seems likely that the post-war regime of increasingly free (intra-)trade of manufacturers and, latterly, of services reflects a response to the possibilities that falling costs of distance generated, together with some other technological and social changes which arose in the postwar era. An endogenous theory of the freeing of trade may contribute to our understanding as to why agricultural liberalisation has been so disappointing, for land cannot migrate like other factors.

Nationalism and Culture

A central issue in the globalisation debate is that of nationalism. In Europe, in particular, nationalism was a nineteenth century response to the falling costs of distance in regions. (Twentieth century nationalism in ex-colonies may be a different story.) Alesina et al. (2000) suggest that freeing trade makes economies based on countries possible, the intuition being that trade reduces the economic costs of international boundaries because a country need not be as self sufficient. Anti-globalisers would go on to argue that the boundaries become less effective in other ways too, but issues of why and how nation-states exist has to be addressed. It is possible the nation-state is a temporary phase, although perhaps it is significant the Kyoto agreement is being implemented via nations rather than through an international regime. But nations are not just economic entities, they are also cultural ones. The internationalisation of culture, as far as it is taking place is a consequence of the falling costs of distance which enables some cultures to dominate others that were previously naturally protected.

Non-economic Issues

There are also some globalisation issues which are not primarily economic, even though – like terrorism – they could impact on the world economy. These include international political relations where diminishing distance – including for military logistics, the speed at which diplomats can move around, and the public’s awareness of foreign tragedies – are transforming the nature of world politics. Another non-economic issue for Australasia is that once their first line of defence against the international spread of plant, animal and human disease was the voyage times from other countries. Today their transmission is much faster.

The Implications of the Falling Costs of Distance

Blainey concludes the third edition of his classic book with that while ‘it is tempting to proclaim distance is dead’, in fact ‘distance is tamed but far from dead’. (2003, p. 359). It is a conclusion greatly reinforced by some dimensions of distance being effectively zero (communications) while others remain comparatively large (goods shipped by sea). Distance has not shrunk uniformly since the great phase of nineteenth century globalisation. It still presents a challenge.

During the nineteenth century the balance of economic activity shifted from agriculture to manufacturing in the Western type economies, for it was also a period of industrialisation. Manufacturing processes, once performed locally, moved to increasingly larger factories, as the falling costs of distance made possible the reaping of economies of scale. Australasia’s ancestors moved from their villages into the vast slums of Britain and the rest of Europe. There was an extraordinary destruction of the environment by the ‘dark satanic mills’, polluting air and water and destroying eco-systems. Economic historians debate whether living standards rose or fell over the nineteenth century. They probably rose for some, fell for others. The process of industrialisation led to much personal and social trauma as well as environmental damage. Today’s descendants are the beneficiaries of that suffering.

Over time mankind learned to harness the new technologies by the creation of regulating social institutions: factory acts preventing the use of child labour, regulations; public infrastructure dealing with the disposal of waste and public hygiene (as well as reducing the costs of distance); social security protecting those which the industrial market failed to support; workers’ compensation responding to increasing accidents in the new factories. So gradually – step by step – the capitalist tiger unleashed by nineteenth century technological change was tamed as mankind learned to control the forces and make them work in our interests.

At an early stage of nineteenth century globalisation and industrialisation, a major dispute took place within the Left. On one side was the French anarchist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Appalled by the human costs of the changes, he argued for a reversion to the way of life which preceded these changes, with a nostalgia for an Arcadia which never existed, but he hoped to recreate. Another version of the Arcadian nostalgia was among some of the reasons people came to Australasia. They thought to escape the trauma of European industrialisation by coming to green and pleasant lands, and starting afresh to create a utopia (not, one adds, always sensitive to the indigenous people already there, nor to the indigenous environment).

The best-known opposition to Proudhon came from Karl Marx who argued that industrialisation and globalisation were essentially progressive forces. The processes, he said, was unstoppable, even though they caused misery to the worker caught up in the transformation to the new economy. But, Marx went on to argue, ultimately the outcome would benefit workers with the creation of a ‘communist’ state, in which they would enjoy the fruits of their labour.

With hindsight we can see that Marx was broadly correct. Sure, we have not reached any communist state – Marx himself was a bit vague about what he meant by the notion. But ultimately the workers of the world are better off. Had they retreated to the nostalgia of Arcadia, they would not be, for they would be isolated from the benefits of the technology which drove globalisation and industrialisation. Admittedly there has not been much equity in the sharing of the fruits of the transformation. Among those who have benefited least were those in the continents of Africa and Asia. Nineteenth century globalisation only really applied to those of European origin (just as some of the main beneficiaries of late twentieth century globalisation have been East Asians).

Yet no matter how awful some of the effects of nineteenth century industrialisation were, our ancestors, informed more by democratic socialism than the ideas of Marx or Proudhon, learned to control it and to benefit from it. That is the challenge and the prospect also for this bout of globalisation, to harness the forces of globalisation, not to deny them. To do so, we need to understand the implications of the uneven reductions in the costs of distance.

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Notes
[1] I am grateful to Sayeeda Bano, Rob Bowie, Bill Rosenberg, Ron Sandrey, Frank Stillwell, two anonymous referees and Margherita Standing for comments on earlier versions
[2] The Australian trade discourse often focuses on Elaborately Traded Manufacturers, which might be treated as a proxy for intra-industry trade. However they do not cover trading in services (an increasingly important phenomenon in a globalised world) and they are not always sold into the tough markets of other sophisticated manufacturers.
[3] One referee mentioned the fallacy of composition insofar as ‘each capitalist (typically) believes he or she can use the new capital to personal advantage.’

References
Alesina, A., Spolaore, E. & Wacziarg, R. 2000, ‘Economic Integration and Political Disintegration,’ The American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 5, December 2000, pp.1276-1296.
Bano, S. 2002, Intra-Industry Trade and Trade Intensities: Evidence from New Zealand, Working Paper 5/02, Department of Economics, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
Blainey, G. 1966, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History , (2nd edn 1983, 3rd edn 2001), Sun Books, Sydney.
Easton, B. 1997, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy , UOP, Dunedin.
Easton, B. 2002, ‘Globalisation and Labour Markets’, Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand: Proceedings of the Tenth Conference: 2002 , Victoria University of Wellington.
Fischer, S. 2003, ‘Globalisation and Its Challenges’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings , vol. 93, no. 2, May 2003, pp.1-30. (Richard T. Ely Lecture, 2003).
Gomory, R. & Baumol, W. 2000, Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests , MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Helpman, E. & Krugman, P. 1985, Market structure and foreign trade: increasing returns, imperfect competition, and the international economy , MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Krugman, P. & Obstfeld, M. 2002, International Economics: Theory and Policy , (5th edn), Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass.
Lipsey, R. & Lancaster, K. 1956, ‘The General Theory of the Second Best’, Review of Economic Studies , vol. 24, no. 1, October, 11-32.
Meade, J. 1955, Trade and Welfare , OUP, London.
O’Rourke, K. & Williamson, J. 1999, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy , MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
Stiglitz, J.E. 2003, The Roaring Nineties , Norton, N.Y.

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Oxytoxic Times: Emotions Are Getting in the Way Of Economic Theory.

Listener 27 December, 2003.

Keywords: History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy;

There was much laughter over the economist who presented a paper that assumed people made optimal calculations when deciding on higher education. The paper plodded on for pages, but came to a grinding halt with a mathematical equation that the presenter could not solve –– without the wit to conclude that the study demonstrated that one needed a degree in mathematics in order to decide whether to go to university.

Can people make sophisticated, rational calculations when they are making highly complicated decisions on education, career path, location and housing, having children and even partners? They simply don’t have the mathematical power, and usually don’t have all the necessary information, either. Yet economists have pursued this rationality assumption with an obsessive vigour. Even if in their own life they use non-optimal decision rules and rely on intuition –– as with the rest of us. (Sometimes reading a mathematically abstruse economic paper purporting to describe human behaviour, one thinks, “The writer has never fallen in love.”)

I suppose the rational calculating optimiser interested only in himself (the economist’s model of man is very masculine) was a reasonable hypothesis when there was no empirical evidence of how people behave. But psychologists have been collecting evidence that suggests the hypothesis can be misleading. So much so that one of the recipients of the Swedish Banks’ 2002 economics prize in honour of Alfred Nobel was a psychologist, Daniel Kahenman. (His co-researcher Amos Tversky would have been similarly honoured had he not died in 1996.) The two found that people making decisions in uncertain times often depart from what is expected under standard economic theory because they rely on shortcuts when analysing complex circumstances. (So we chose to go to university without a degree in mathematics to help us decide.)

There is now a band of economists who are exploiting the psychologists’ insights. The 2004 J B Clark medal, the second most prestigious prize in economics, was awarded to economist Matthew Rabin. (He is quite a character –– very sweet, modest, loud clothes, zany sense of humour –– who makes economists seem fun. We can’t have that!) Steeped in the psychological literature, Rabin and others use mathematical models based on psychology to draw extraordinary economic insights. Once economists invaded other disciplines’ territories with imperial arrogance. But the successes have been those who have co-operated with the other disciplines.

Does it matter? An official told journalist Bob Edlin that Treasury was “trying to get to grips with the importance of this work and how it can be translated into policy”. Yeah, right. Apparently, they think “that the lesson may be that governments would do well to give up trying to finetune the economy”, which was exactly their policy under the old theory. Have they learnt nothing? I would have thought that the evidence of individuals using rules rather than optimising behaviour, such as explicated by Richard Thaler, suggests that our policy strategy towards private savings and an individual’s educational investment is fundamentally misconceived. Sadly, there remain “rationalist” economists who are reluctant to abandon their narrow rationalist training for the richer insights that are becoming available (which itself is an irrational thing to do).

It is not just big questions where economic calculus does not seem to work. Consider the choice between $3000 now and $3800 in a couple of months. Hardline economics says that it depends on your “time discount rate”. It also depends on whether you have been sucking sweets. Those who have forgo the instant gratification of cash now for more in the future. The hardliners treat the discount as a fundamental variable. Rather, it appears to be at the whim of one’s blood sugar level. (Of course, most mothers know the sweeties trick, but watch out for your banker offering you a lolly –– perhaps they should.)

Another disturbing –– or, if you wish, humanising –– finding involves the “ultimatum game”. Here we need only observe that most people ignore the obvious rational economic strategy, and give their opponent more than self-interest requires. Physiological studies show that people who do so have elevated levels of oxytocin, the hormone associated with birthing, breastfeeding, touching, making love and –– more generally –– human bonding. Emotions matter in economic decisions.

So it is not just that we don’t do the complicated mathematical calculations that the rationalist economists assume (even if they can’t always do them themselves) and instead use rules of thumb, which give different results to the optimising mathematics. We also take into account others’ interests. As John Donne says, no man is an island, entire of itself, but is a part of the continent of all humanity. The bells that toll for Christmas and New Year also toll for thee.

Measuring Ppp-adjusted Gdp: an Anomaly

This is the second of a series of papers concerned with PPP measures. The papers are in varying presentational styles and also reflect my growing understanding of the issues involved, and my improving presentation of them.See Measuring PPP-adjusted GDP Index for the other papers. This paper, written in December 2003, is an exposition based on tabulations.

Keywords: Statistics;

Introduction

There exists an anomaly in the measurement of PPP-adjusted GDPs, in that there is no need for the production-side and the expenditure-side estimates to be consistent. This arises because the expenditure-side measure values a good which is consumed differently from a good which is exported. The practice is to use an ‘average’ domestic price for all consumed good and to use the internationally traded price for exported (and imported) goods. In principle where there is vigorous market competition and no government intervention, the two prices should be consistent. In practice there may be a substantial difference, especially where there is a high degree of protection.

The problem does not seem to have been observed before, because currently the only comprehensive estimates have used the expenditure-side measure. As more attention is paid to the production-side measure, as a part of industry productivity studies, the anomaly will become more apparent.

An Illustration

Consider two countries, X and Y with a ROW (Rest of the World) so large that it sets the international prices used in the purchasing power parity adjustments.

The two countries make but two goods, A and B, measured in some standard unit (say tonnes). Country X produces 60 tonnes of good A and 40 tonnes of good B, while Country Y produces 40 tonnes of good A and 60 tonnes of Good B.

Each country consumes 50 tonnes of good A and 50 tones of good B, so Country X exports 10 tonnes of good A to Country Y in exchange for 10 tonnes of Good B.

The illustration is so simple we do not need to know the prices that apply in Country A and B. The PPP prices, in effect those of Country ROW are given by

PPP price of good A = $1 per tonne.
PPP price of good B = $2 per tonne.

Note that the relative PPP price of the goods is different from the price at which Country A and country B trade (reflecting the protection which ROW does to its production of good B).

The following tables shows the calculations for each country to give the PPP-adjusted GDP.

COUNTRY X: Production-side Estimate

  Quantity PPP Price Value
Good A 60 1 60
Good B 40 2 80
Trade n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total     140

COUNTRY X: Expenditure-side Estimate

  Quantity PPP Price Value
Good A 50 1 50
Good B 50 2 100
Exports 10 1 10
Imports -10 1 -10
Total     150

COUNTRY Y: Production-side Estimate

  Quantity PPP Price Value
Good A 40 1 40
Good B 60 2 120
Trade n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total     160

COUNTRY Y: Expenditure-side Estimate

  Quantity PPP Price Value
Good A 50 1 50
Good B 50 2 100
Exports 10 1 10
Imports -10 1 -10
Total     150

The result of the difference between the PPP and the internationally traded price relativities is that while the expenditure side PPP-adjusted GDP is the same in each country (at 150) , the production side adjusted GDPs differ. In particular Country Y which exports the good which is protected against has a higher relative GDP (160) on the production side than Country X (140).

Note that this happens even if Country X does not protect its own production. The anomaly arises because of world protection.

Interpretation

This difference occurs because the export production of the protected good is valued at the (protected) production cost at the rest of the world (and at the same average world price at which it is consumed in the country and elsewhere), rather that at the price at which it is traded (which is depressed relative to the protection).

The measures of GDP represent different things:

The production-side measure reports the production of the country at the average world prices. It is the cross-country equivalent to real GDP through time.

The expenditure-side measure reports the expenditure of the country at average world prices with an adjustment for the current account deficit (when nominal GDP exceeds nominal GNE). It is the cross-country equivalent to real GDI through time.

Conclusion

The aim of this note is not to argue which measure is the ‘correct’ one, but to point out that they are conceptually different. In this case – there may be others – the difference arises because the international trade price of the good is different from the domestic trade price as a consequence of protection.

The estimates can be reconciled by valuing the internationally traded good in the expenditure side estimate at the PPP price rather than the international traded price. This would make no difference to total World GDP (since the boost to exports in exporting countries would be exactly offset by the reduction to imports in importing countries). It would, however, change the distribution of World GDP between countries.

Whether this effect is large or small is an empirical issue. However, it seems likely that the current procedure may markedly depress the relative GDP of some economies which are significant agricultural exporters. Even if the effect were small, the need to give confidence in the integrity of the published estimates of PPP-adjusted GDP, requires that the effect be measured and that both measures of GDP be reported.

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Three Short Book Reviews: for the 2003 listener Books Of the Year.

Listener: 20 December 2003.

Keywords: Environment & Resources; Governance; Macroeconomics & Money;

TREASURY: The New Zealand Treasury 1840-2000, by Malcolm McKinnon (AUP, $50).

The most powerful government advisers in the land now have their own history. McKinnon shows how an institution of unimportant 19th-century clerks evolved through accountancy in the early 20th century into the abominable “no-men” economists who had a stranglehold on so much of government thereafter. The genial story is not without its Gothic elements, and it also has some intriguing personal details –– among the Secretaries of the Treasury were a chairman of the New Zealand Rugby Union, a Grand Master of the Order of Freemasons and one who took ballet lessons to relieve stress. Superbly presented, and just the right size to throw at any Treasury official who has not time for history.

THE GREAT UNRAVELLING: Losing our way in the new century, by Paul Krugman (Viking, $35).

Who would have thought when the New York Times asked him to write a regular column, that eminent economist Paul Krugman would convert into one of America’s most gifted and crusading political journalists. George Bush and his administration are expertly and relentlessly savaged, in each op-ed that bristles with such words as “lying”, “mendacity”, “unscrupulous” and “fraud”. He has often been the first in the mainstream to identify the scandalous, which he presents with nary an acknowledgement to bipartisanship. If you can’t get to the Times for those two days a week when Krugman contributes, this book of the columns gives you the flavour of their vigour and insight. Oh, to be able to wake up to such writing in New Zealand.

THE LOST WORLD OF THE MOA: Prehistoric life of New Zealand, by Trevor Worthy and Richard Holdaway (Canterbury University Press, $169.50).

Okay, what a price. But as Tim Flannery, author of the acclaimed The Future Eaters, wrote: this book “documents in unprecedented detail the evolution of life in the strangest corner of our planet, the archipelago of New Zealand. Worthy and Holdaway [New Zealand scientists who work as independent scholars] are among the world’s leading palaeontologists, and in this book they have created a masterwork that will stand for years for those interested in the evolution of New Zealand’s vertebrate fauna.” This is as close as it gets to a live moa.

Brian Easton, D.sc.

On 17 December, 2003 the University of Canterbury conferred a D.Sc. on Brian Easton for studies in the Political Economy of New Zealand.

The public citation stated:

The Doctor of Science was awarded for research on the political economy of New Zealand and assessed on the basis of four recently published books:
The Nationbuilders: a description of new Zealand economic policy and the economic debate since the 1930s around biographies of some of the key players;
In Stormy Seas: an analysis of the New Zealand economy since the war;
The Commercialisation of New Zealand: the development of policy from 1984;
The Whimpering of the State: policy development after the introduction of MMP.

(The Origins of the Four Books)

The event was celebrated by attendance by many family and friends (‘whanau’ as the Vice Chancellor put it). About twenty of them.

When I was capped forty years ago there was my grandmother, her sister (great-aunt Rhona) and my father. Alas they were not there except in spirit, for I wore a rose in my lapel from Dad’s bush …

… and Nana’s daughters – Dad’s sisters – Aunt Betty and Aunty Joan were there.

The conferment (capping) is a formal process in which one walks bareheaded across the stage …

… to shake hands with the Chancellor, who gives one a certificate. At this point the cap (in my case a bonnet or beret) may be put on.

But first I turned to the stage an acknowledged my teachers and academic colleagues (for I taught at the University of Canterbury).

Sitting in the audience was Wolf Rosenberg, my oldest surviving teacher. (Homeric, here with Ann.) I have not always agreed with everything he has argued, but I shall forever value the conversations where his courtesy has enabled us to converse with passion on issues which are important to us, without the breakdown that so often happens in our profession. Oddly, though, I did not learn enough from Wolf’s very first lecture, at Curious Cove in 1962, on the topic of ‘the dangers of being an economist’. Oh, if only I had listened, I’d have done something else – I was attracted to astronomy at the time. Perhaps he is glad that on this one occasion he did not get his message across.

I turned to the audience and acknowledged them,

then put my cap on,

but took it off at the bottom of the stairs to acknowledge the whanau in the balcony, especially Mum, my first teacher, who should wear the cap too.

***********

These pictures were taken by Rob Bowie.

Notes Towards the New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Introduction

The conditions for a Marsden Grant require some technology transfer above the publication of articles and teaching. My successful application for a contribution to my research program on globalisation proposed that I would establish a virtual New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies (NZCGS), since I am not in a position to supervise research students directly.

The broad aims of the centre would be to foster the study of globalisation in New Zealand by providing a virtual venue where New Zealand researchers can interact . Additionally it is likely to be an interface between New Zealand globalisation research and the world research community.

For the purpose of the centre I propose to adapt the Stiglitz/Fisher definition and define globalisation as the phenomenon of greater economic integration of nations and regions. I have added ‘regions’ to their definition, because there is a continuity between the regional integration of the nineteenth century which led to national economies (e.g. the German Customs Union/Zollverein evolving into Germany) and the current national integration (e.g. Germany in the EU). My earlier definition of ‘globalisation as the consequence of the falling costs of distance’ has a number of analytic merits, and I shall continue to use it as the basis of my research program. But I do not want others to be forced to sign up to it.

Although I have defined globalisation in economic terms, it should be emphasised that the Centre is not concerned with narrow economic issues, and needs to include every other relevant discipline. (I have never been sure about the boundaries between economics and the other social sciences.)

I add that I think globalisation is one of the defining characteristics of the modern world, the greatest economic challenge New Zealand faces, but also the greatest source of opportunity for a successfully developing New Zealand.

What Kind of Centre?

There is very little funding in the Marsden Grant for a centre – sufficient for a webmaster and the related website fees. In any case there is a piquancy both that a globalisation centre should be virtual, and that it offers the possibility to avoid all the institutional rivalries which arise from the fragmentation of research in NZ between universities (and campuses), and to integrate in the growing off-campus research. (I have already reserved www.nzglobalisation.ac.nz for the site.)

Having said that, if any institution was to offer a physical base – with appropriate resources – one would have to give the offer careful consideration. In some respects the ‘branch’ structure proposed below gives the possibility of a physical base.

Governance

Since Centres have directors, I suppose the founding director is Brian Easton. He is a researcher, not an administrator, and as soon as anyone wants to take over (providing they also supply the resources) Brian will happily step down.

Centres usually have boards. The whole aim of a virtual centre is to have an administratively simple structure, but there may be a place for a board, not only to moderate the director, but also to get more involvement of others. A simple board might arise by inviting each NZ university to nominate one person to act as link person to the Centre. Collectively the liaison people could be ‘the Board’. It might be worth adding to the Board up to a further (say) eight people to cover New Zealand researchers overseas, research institutions outside the universities (including polytechnics) and also disciplines not otherwise covered in the membership. They would be added by the existing Board following nomination. I don’t expect the Board to ever meet formally in real space, its transactions being in virtual space.

If we have a board we need a chairperson to keep the director in line. He or she will have to be in Wellington (as long as the director is). Someone eminent and informed with the time, I’d have thought (but that is an oxymoron). Probably not in a university? Does the director appoint a temporary chair as a part of the setting up process?

We need to allow the possibility for branches of the Centre. The sort of thing I have in mind would a group of enthusiasts at a university meeting over a seminar series, perhaps with a sub-website. However, we should not be prescriptive about what they cannot or can do, EXCEPT to be clear the centre and branches are essentially research organisations; they should never make public policy announcements – other than that we are in favour of more research funding for, and debate about, globalisation.

What about members? Centres usually have fellows, and some researchers like the title. So let’s have Fellows, defined as active researchers on globalisation. The only ‘privilege’ that the Fellows would have would be to have their names in the list of Fellows on the website, with their main interests, and a link to their personal web pages. I suppose the Board would have to approve each Fellow, but the criterion needs to be simple: an active research program and a webpage. There is no need to restrict the Fellows to living in New Zealand. I am promoting Diaspora Studies.

There will also be non-researchers interested in the activities of the Centre. I envisage the Centre’s website being open to the public. Perhaps there will have to be a registration system for associates on the discussion boards.

This could be formalised as a preliminary ‘constitution’ to be put up on the website for discussion and amendment.

It is easier to see the final shape of the centre than the transition to setting it up. Hopefully people will bear with the mistakes that occur during that period.

Should there be ‘corporate sponsors’ (including government departments)? It would be a way of involving non-academic institutions which have an interest in promoting the objectives of the centre.

The Website

I am proposing, tentatively, that the website have the following features.

1. The usual introductions and administration material
2. News
3. Diary of conferences seminars and visitors
4. A list of Fellows with links to their websites, and a search facility for identifying Fellows with particular interests.
5. Links to relevant websites
6. Links to relevant web-published research papers.
7. Possibly – a refereed web-based publication of occasional papers.
8. Synopses and reviews (say less than 500 words, or links). These need no be confined to NZ studies.
9. Bulletin boards for discussion. (I suppose it will be moderated. The only bit I really care about is to contain personal abuse while promoting vigorous debate about ideas. Any other reasons for moderation – relevance?)
10. Research questions (bulletin board format)
11. Anything else? – presumably it can evolve.

Note that the branches should be able to be part of the board, via links and news.

Research

It is perhaps ironic that despite research being the focus of the Centre, and despite an attempt to minimise the Centre as an administrative/resource institution, the section on research comes last.

The Centre will enhance New Zealand research on globalisation by the synergies which come from New Zealand (including those overseas) researchers better connecting. There is a lot of New Zealand research which is isolated within institutions, by discipline and by location. I have already been contacted by a range of people doing research in the area I had not previously known about. My impression, too, is that there are numerous post-graduate students desperate for New Zealand material and contacts.

Hopefully too a vigorous website will encourage others – both full researchers and post-graduates – to work on globalisation projects.

And the website as a portal for the rest of the world may promote synergies between local and overseas researchers (perhaps not just in the globalisation research area)..

While the Centre itself will do no research – its Fellows do – perhaps it could facilitate the funding of research on globalisation. Examples are

1. The applications for some public research funds involve minimum amounts which exceed the requirements of individual researchers. Perhaps the Centre could facilitate the amalgamation of small packages into one which meets the minimum quantum.

2. I have some research I want done for my project which I don’t intend to do myself (I don’t have a comparative advantage in the methods, nor the time). In one case I even know a potential funder, who will probably want to do it under the aegis of the Centre.

3. There are overseas New Zealanders who are involved in cross-country comparisons. The cost of adding New Zealand to their study is small compared to the potential gains of comparative information. Could the Centre promote these add-ons? (Incidentally these studies need not be about globalisation per se. Rather they are an illustration of the globalisation of research.)

As things proceed there may be more such opportunities. A centre by its presence can attract funds, offering the opportunity to leverage existing research. On the other hand this director does not see himself as raising funds for others to spend. We need to be modest in our objectives.

Conferences and Visitors

It has been suggested the centre could run conferences and host visitors. Well yes, except the centre has not yet the resources. (What would a ‘virtual conference’ be like?)

Brian Easton (December 2003)

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Stressful Fiscal Sums: Should the Government Spend More and Tax Less?

Listener: 13 December, 2003.

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

The history of the modern Treasury –– described in Malcolm McKinnon’s landmark Treasury –– is one of fiscal stress, extreme fiscal stress or intolerable fiscal stress. You might think from the government accounts that is not currently true, for the Treasury reported a “surplus” of $5.6 billion for the year ending June 2003 and promises another comparable one this year. (This surplus’s exact name is “operating balance excluding revaluations and accounting changes” or OBERAC.) For a detailed description of the OBERAC.

I am not saying that the numbers are funny money, as with the Enron accounts. Indeed, there is considerable integrity and rigour in the way that the government’s accounts are compiled. But it is a complicated measure that should be approached with caution. Some of the surplus is used for financing state-owned enterprises, health boards, Housing NZ, lending to students and buying physical assets. A more useful measure is that there was a cash surplus of only $1.2 billion, which was used to pay off government debt.

But should there be any surplus? A common view is that the $1.2b should be spent on priorities such as health, education, children, tax cuts …… There is even the view that the government should be running a deficit, borrowing to spend more on those priorities. The view partly derives from earlier times when the government borrowed each year, but in those days it was running a number of businesses that have since been privatised with enormous investment requirements (notably Telecom), while today SOEs borrow on their own behalf. Allow for these, and past governments were probably also running cash surpluses on today’s basis.

The published justification for the cash surplus is that the government wants to reduce its debt, a prudent strategy if it does not damage the economy, and one that will give considerable room for manoeuvre, if there is a world economic or financial crash. (The US Government has hardly any left since its recent tax cuts and booming budget deficits.)

What about the (“Cullen”) New Zealand Superannuation Fund largely invested in equities, for the day when the elderly become a greater burden on the economy? We can argue whether equity investment is the best way to provide for the future, but most economists think the prudent alternative is to run a bigger cash surplus and pay off government debt faster. That means the fund can’t be used for more spending and lower taxes.

So we are back to just how big the cash surplus should be. As well as the Fiscal Responsibility Act’s monetarist case for mechanically paying off government debt, there is also a Keynesian one. Although Keynesianism is associated with budget deficits, the real message is that the government spending and taxing activities can be used to influence the macroeconomy. Think of the spending and tax cuts as the petrol your accelerator pedal injects into your car. Keynesians argue that if the car is running too slowly, then inject more petrol. But they also argue that if the car is going too fast, ease off the petrol. Given the current healthy state of the economy, I’d have thought the current injection was about right.

What happens if one tries to run the car too fast? It may exceed the speed limit, in which case the Reserve Bank will issue a penalising speeding ticket of higher interest rates that switches off the injection from private investment, and so compromise economic growth. Or, more subtly, the other great injector for growth in the economy, the tradable sector, switches off. High total injections raise the exchange rate. (Look at the US exchange rate since the US increased its government deficit to unsustainable levels.) That makes it harder to export and easier to import. Again, long-run growth will be compromised. Running cash surplus enables sustainable growth though the tradeable sector.

The good news is that although the government is likely to aim for something close to that $1.2 billion cash surplus, with the strong tax inflows and tight spending controls, it may have an extra $1.5 to $2 billion to spend or reduce taxes in the next budget. Some of that is already committed (as for the health sector), but the government has more room for manoeuvre, and there may be a boomlet in public spending and even (small) tax cuts. The danger is that it could over-react and lose fiscal control. Soon the tradeable sector would be in difficulties, as interest rates and the exchange rate went up.

So, yes, although there is a threat, the fiscal stress is lower than it has been. From the Treasury building at 1 The Terrace, one hears the shout “LET’S KEEP IT THAT WAY”.

Notes on Oberac. the Cash Surplus and Other Measures in the Government Accounts:

This note was written to accompany Stressful Fiscal Sums: Should the Government Spend More and Tax Less? I am grateful for assistance from an economist who for various reasons cannot be named.Stressful Fiscal Sums: Should the Government Spend More and Tax Less?

Keywords: Macroeconomics & Money;

OBERAC (the operating balance of government excluding revaluations and accounting policy changes) can be looked at as to how it is made up. and what happens to the quantum. The following focuses on the what happens to it. My comments in italics.

For the fiscal year just ended June 2003, OBERAC = $5.6 billion.

Some was used for State Owned Enterprises and such like
– $800m was for retained earnings (after dividends) and depreciation of the Government’s trading activities. The sum is included in OBERAC for comprehensiveness. So the government never actually got its hands on this money, but it could if it was desperate (although that would limit the effectiveness of the SOEs).
– $500m was for capital injections into Crown entities and State Owned Enterprises. The Crown received $214m in dividends, so the SOEs and Crown entities were a net cash drain, although they are building up national assets via the new investments, and their retained earnings.
– $200m was advances to District Health Boards and Housing New Zealand, similar to the advances to Crown entities.

Some was used for purchasing physical assets used by the public service such as building schools, defence equipment, computers and cars
– $1000m In the OBERAC is an allowance for the depreciation (loss of value) of physical capital assets of the Crown as they become less effective. The amount for the core agencies comes to about $900 million, so this item balances off that depreciation, and means that the Crown is maintaining the level of its capital assets in its core activities.

Some was advanced to students as loans for their tertiary education
– $700m was the net advance after some students repaid part or all of their loans. Whatever one may think of the student loans policy – for my views see The Index on Education and related topics – it is correct to deduct this amount from OBERAC since the cash given to the students is not available to pay off loans.

Some was a contribution to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund
– $1200m. The government has chosen to put some of its savings into the NZSF, which is to be largely invested in equities. The aim is a nest egg to be used for the growth of the proportion of the elderly in the population, and their higher burden on society in future years. There are two issues here. First, whether the government should make some provision: prudence says ‘yes’. Second, whether the provision should be investment in equities? This latter issue is more contentious (I must write on it some day). If the answer to this second question is ‘no’, as a consequence of the response to the first question, the government needs to lower its debt even further than it currently does (or take some other roughly equivalent measure). Thus those who want to abandon the NZSF would want a greater cash surplus in order to pay off the debt. Unless one wants to deny the economic significance of the demographic change, there are no tax cuts from abandoning the NZFS.

So from the OBERAC $5.6b we deduct various government investments to get to the $1.2b cash surplus. For an economist the $1.2b is more tangible than the $5.6b, which reflect various conventions which, while rigorous, may be disputed in terms of the usefulness of the measure.

OBERAC’s name tells us that there are other elements which could, or could not, be added to the total.
– Excluding changes from accounting policy makes sense.
– Revaluations may be positive or negative. Among them is that when interest rates fall, government guaranteed funds have less revenue from their investments in bonds, and find it more difficult to meet their outlay commitments and so are likely to call further on the government. The practice is to charge the public account when the funds have to be paid. (An example is the Government Superannuation Fund.) I agree charging the shortfall when it has to be paid out is the sensible practice.
– On the other hand the value of some assets change (e.g. the market price of equities held by investment funds), and those changes are not included either.

In some respects (changes in accounting policies aside – and they can be large) a better measure is changes in ‘Net Worth’, which is the value of all the Crown’s assets less all the Crown’s liabilities. Net Worth rose from $18.8b in June 2002 to $23.8b in June 2003, or by $5.0b.

None of these measures are precisely helpful for an economist concerned with the pressure of government economic activities on the economy and hence the right budget deficit/surplus policy. Suppose we start with the $1.2b cash surplus for last year. We would probably want to add the investment activities of the SOEs and others, outside the government account, since they are result in the government using more resources. On the other hand some government spending is overseas – overseas aid, military hardware, foreign debt repayments, NZFS investments in overseas equities, …. – so they dont impact on resource demands within New Zealand. There is a Treasury paper Indicators of Fiscal Impulse for New Zealand by Renee Philip and John Janssen which explores some of these issues.

In summary, while various measures from the government accounts are quoted in public, it is rare for those most vehement in the public debate to understand the complexities in the definitions of the measures, and the audiences are even less informed. There is no doubt that OBERAC is a poor indicator of the state of the government finances for the assessing changes in aggregate spending and taxation. The cash surplus is better, but even so it does not give a comprehensive indication of the government’s aggregate impact on the economy’s resources. Moreover there is no a priori reason for the cash surplus being positive, negative or zero. So the fact that the cash surplus was $1.2b in the June 2003 year does not tell us whether the government had more room to increase spending or reduce taxation.

Accident Compensation (index)

Keywords: Social Policy;

Compensating Factors (April 1981)

The Historic Context of the Woodhouse Commission (July 2002)

Submission on Review of Medical Misadventure (April 2003)

Ending Fault in Accident Compensation: Issues and Lessons From Medical Misadventure (December 2003)

Accidents Will Happen (April 2004)

Medical Misadventures: Should Patients Be Compensated for Managerial Failure? (February 2005)

I was also involved in the 2007/8 review of the Accredited Employers Scheme, but was not a major player in the writing of. the final report

Ending Fault in Accident Compensation:

Issues and Lessons from Medical Misadventure
Paper to The Future of Accident Compensation: New Directions and Visions, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 5-6 December, 2003.

Keywords: Social Policy;

Introduction: The Woodhouse Vision

There seems to be common agreement that the treatment of medical misadventure should conform to the Woodhouse Principles and therefore there should be no notion of fault in its coverage. I shall not to labour this point, but it is worthwhile to remind ourselves of the Principles and how the 1966 Commission rejected fault as relevant. Their primary principles were

“Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation – Injury arising from accident demands an attack on three fronts. The most important (sic) is obviously prevention. Next in importance is the obligation to rehabilitate the injured. Thirdly, there is a duty to compensate them for their losses. The second and third of these matters can be handled together, but the priorities between them need to be reversed. No compensation procedure can ever be allowed to take charge of the efforts being made to restore a man to health and gainful employment.” It added that “Safety – This needs no elaboration. Any modern compensation scheme must have a branch concerned solely with safety. …” And then set down Five General Principles for rehabilitation and compensation:

Community Responsibility
Comprehensive Entitlement
Complete Rehabilitation
Real Compensation
Administrative Efficiency.

Note that the Woodhouse Commission did not recommend the abandonment of the fault approach when it established its basic principles. Rather the abandonment derived from its application of those principles, for it found that

“(2) The fault principle cannot logically be used to justify the common law remedy and is erratic and capricious in operation. …
(5) The common law remedy falls far short of the five requirements outlined in the report .”

The Gains from No-Fault Medical Misadventure

I suggest there are three significant gains when medical error is no longer recognised in the scheme:

1. Speedier decisions and lower compliance costs, because the health professionals will be less defensive and the assessment less complicated.

2. The opportunity for more effective preventative programs, again arising out of the health professional being less defensive.

3. Fewer vexatious claims, because no longer would the Accident Compensation System be seen as a disciplinary body.

Depending on the criterion of medical misadventure used, the apparent cost of the scheme may rise, but those costs are transfers, The gains just nominated involve genuine reductions in compliance costs, and so gains to the economy as a whole.

Some Problems the New Scheme will Face

Here are some of the difficulties the new arrangements will face:

Compliance Costs

The medical fault system generates compliance costs. (Recall that the Woodhouse Commission was able to offer a better deal at less cost by eliminating the compliance costs as a result of litigation.) The system needs to continually, review, measure and where possible reduce compliance costs. including speeding up its decisions.

For instance, current procedures require the same investigative procedure irrespective of the cost of the remediation. In some cases the cost of the remediation is a fraction of the cost of assessment. In Submission on Review of Medical Misadventure I suggested a procedure involving a prima facie finding, which gives the authority the discretion to approve the undertaking of the rehabilitation without further investigation, where the costs of remediation are small. However, it would not cover compensation – that is the payments of monies – in order to reduce ‘gold-digging’.

Time is a compliance cost. Remediation takes time. In the case of medical misadventure – in its widest sense – the professionalism of the health system will mean that rehabilitation will be addressed immediately if possible. However, especially given the fracturing of funding and institutions, this will not always happen, and the injured may have to go through an ACC assessment. Can we reduce the effect of this fracturing and provide institutions with incentives to provide practical remediation as early as possible?

Wither Prevention?

There is potential for considerable gains in the prevention of misadventure. However because of institutional fragmentation – between ACC, the professional bodies, and the health providers – the potential of the ending of medical failure may not be realised.

One simple step for promoting prevention, would be to encourage the expert advisers to recommend measures to reduce the repeating the misadventure in the cases they review. But should they go as far as identifying potentially unsafe health professionals?

There is a finely balanced argument here. Taking the system right out of the identification of incompetent health professionals enables ACC to focus on its fundamental objectives, encourages cooperation by those involved in the case being investigated, and prevents a fault principle slipping back in. Moreover past experience suggests that all the unsafe professionals have already been known to the relevant authorities.

On the other hand dealing with unsafe professionals is an effective form of prevention. Even more fundamentally, it would hardly be ethical for an expert advisor to identify an unsafe professional and not to make some effective comment on her or him.

Practically, consider a subsequent public enquiry into some medical misadventure, which involved an adviser having to say that in the expert’s opinion a health professional was incompetent, but the expert had not mentioned that judgement in the report, or if it was, ACC had done nothing about it. Politics suggests this practical consideration may be decisive. How then to maintain all the benefits of the scheme. The issue becomes defining an appropriate threshold.

The Line Between Entitlement and No-entitlement

The line between medical misadventure which gives an entitlement to rehabilitation and compensation has still to be agreed. I want to make two points here.

The first is about informed consent. If an event is so rare that it was not mentioned when informed consent to the medical intervention was given, then it is surely medical misadventure. Of course there are many rare events which are mentioned when informed consent is being given, but which are medical misadventure. And sometimes the putative patient may not be advised of outcomes when informed consent is being given, which are common enough not to amount to medical misadventure. So how does informed consent relate to the definition of medical misadventure? In particular, if the patent was not advised of a possible outcome, no matter how common, are they more likely to be entitled to remediation?

The second issue is the historic one, identified at the very beginning by the Woodhouse Commission, of the inequity that sickness is treated differently from by accident, even where the outcome to the patient is be same. The same problem will apply to sickness and medical misadventure. In The Historic Context of the Woodhouse Commission I pointed out that the inequity arose because the Woodhouse proposals were funded from the reductions in compliance costs of the discarded common law (fault premised) system, but there was no such gains if the system were extended to sickness. Thus, removal of the inequity would raise a substantial fiscal cost, one which thus far the nation has been unwilling to pay. Where the medical misadventure definition is drawn will contribute to increasing or reducing this inequity, but it will not eliminate it (and it will generate compliance costs).

The problem is that the entitlement is input driven rather than outcome driven. It depends upon the path to the injury not the destination. That generates the inequity, so let’s go back and consider why has the different paths for the same outcome arisen?

Why Should There Be Compensation?

The origins of the path which leads to compensation are deeply associated with the notion of fault. Compensation was justified by
– it would seem inequitable that the person who caused the accident and the resulting damage should be no worse off while the victim is;
– it provided a market incentive to discourage individuals causing accidents.

Thus monetary compensation is a living fossil in the New Zealand no-fault system, left over from the fault based path, even though there is no practical implication for a person who is at fault (except the criminal law).

Focussing on Rehabilitation

The Woodhouse report defined rehabilitation as

The restoration of the handicapped to the fullest physical, mental, social, vocational, and economic usefulness of which they are capable. It is a total process which begins with the earliest treatment of the injury or disease. It does not end until everything has been done to achieve maximum social and economic independence. The aim is that this should be achieved in a minimum of time.

One of the reasons for the focus on compensation was that in the past there was few possibilities for rehabilitation other than that compensation. Had there been the possibility of effective rehabilitation is the nineteenth century, the remediation provisions of tort law would have been rather different. More recently, as effective rehabilitation becoming a practical possibility, the Woodhouse Commission prioritised it over compensation.

To go a step further, if there is quality rehabilitation is any compensation necessary at all? Of course the rehabilitation may include cash payments, but it involves a more comprehensive notion.

Suppose individual’s remediation was primarily rehabilitation with monetary compensation only where rehabilitation by itself is inadequate. Would the reoriented scheme cost more or less? Any answer is not just the relative cost of the two approaches, but also dependent upon the relative effectiveness of rehabilitation strategies, which may be getting more successful with time.

A Vision for a Future Direction?

Crucially for the inequity between the two paths, rehabilitation is likely to be increasingly applied in the case of sickness without ACC cover. They will not get compensation, but as I have argued compensation becomes increasingly irrelevant when there is effective rehabilitation.

A way forward out of the inequity then, is

– to accelerate the shift of remediation from compensation to rehabilitation for ACC cover,*
and
– to accelerate the convergence on non-ACC rehabilitation towards the ACC level.

(Note it is important that the first shift is not a driven by the hope of reducing costs, even if it were to do so in the long run. The big gains would be to better remediation and less inequity.)

A careful reading of the report of the Woodhouse Commission suggests that were it to reconvene they would be sympathetic to such a strategy, which has become more feasible in the intervening years. In essence this is not a proposal for radical overnight change but a direction for evolution. But if evolutionary the proposal represents a new direction – extending, I would submit, the original Woodhouse vision.

This paper, then could be summarised by suggesting the direction of evolution should be

– emphasise prevention;

– emphasise rehabilitation and phase out compensation; and

– phase out accident as cause as a the basis of entitlement and phase in the injury income, by providing better rehabilitation to all the injured.

The end point might be the replacement of the

ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION

by the

INJURY PREVENTION AND REHABILITATION CORPORATION

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* It was mentioned in the conference that this process is well underway. Whereas once over 60 percent of ACC expenditure was on compensation, it is now about 30 percent.

The Marsden Globalisation Project

Paper for ‘New Zealand’s Role in World Affairs’ Conference, VUW, 5 December, 2003.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

A few months ago I was awarded a three year Marden Grant to study globalisation and New Zealand’s role in it. It is a topic I have been long working upon, developing out of my earlier study of the New Zealand economy summarised in my book In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand Economy, whose theme can be summarised as ‘the fate of New Zealand will be largely a consequence of what happens overseas, together with our ability to seize the opportunities and manage the problems those events.’

Globalisation presents a definitional problem. Many writers avoid defining it analytically, instead characterising it by a series of particular phenomenon such as increasing trade, or capital flows, or logos, or international inequality; or to particular international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank or the European Union, or multinational corporations; or to particular policies such as free trade, liberalised capital movements, and so on. The London Economist described globalisation as ‘international capitalism’: many anti-globalisers might agree, perhaps adding ‘together with US hegemony’, or even ‘imperialism’.

Stanley Fischer, one time chief economist at the IMF, describes globalisation as ‘the ongoing process of greater interdependence among countries and their citizens’. Joseph Stiglitz, who held a similar position at the World Bank, defines globalisation as ‘the closer integration of countries of the world as a result of lowering transportation and communication, costs, and the removal of artificial man-made barriers.’ Both are focussed on contemporary phenomenon. But it is important that we take a historical perspective. Scholars argue that Nineteenth century globalisation was in many ways a more powerful and pervasive phenomenon that late twentieth century at least among peoples of European origin.

In the end a simple phenomenon-based definition like Fischer’s, may be the most fruitful. We follow Stiglitz, albeit also covering the nineteenth century, with globalisation is the closer integration of nations and regions. However, for an economist, a definition is not sufficient. We need a process, a mechanism. This study is organised around the analytical proposition of globalisation as the consequences of the reductions in the costs of distance.

That these falls have been dramatic is easily demonstrated by considering world centred on New Zealand. One hundred and fifty years ago it took three months to sail from Britain to New Zealand – carrying goods, people and information. Changes since then has reduced the shipping time to about three weeks, quartering distance in the world. But people, and light valuable goods can fly to Britain in under two days, a more than 98 percent reduction. Information can be zipped around the world virtually instantaneously.

If these changes are not spectacular enough, think of the changes for meat and dairy products. One hundred and fifty years ago, one could not ship them to Britain at all. The introduction of refrigeration reduced the cost of distance from – effectively – infinity to a small proportion of the products’ costs of production, and transformed New Zealand’s economy and society.

There is another lesson here. The cost of distance does not diminish uniformly for all products, people, and information, and therein lies its problem. I wont pursue this further here, except to say that the costs of distance are analogous to a tariff, and so all the economists’ theories of protection are available and useful. (Recall that the costs of distance are sometimes called ‘natural protection’.) But because there are only partial reductions in tariffs, and the reductions are at different rates for different products, the relevant theory is far more complicated and far more subtle than the crude theories that underpin free trade.

I shall be working on the theory, elaborating its insights as part of the Marsden project. Additional to the theoretical development, the work program looks like this:

2004
New Zealand and nineteenth century globalisation.
A Fulbright distinguished Visiting Fellowship to spend three months in the United States studying aspects of globalisation.

2005
New Zealand and twentieth century globalisation.
I hope to spend time in Europe studying the European Union which is a particularly interesting form of globalisation.

2006
New Zealand and twenty-first century globalisation.
My travel plans for 2006 are unclear, but probably should include Asia if there are the resources.

There are number of subsidiary themes. A central one is the changing role of the nation state in the international community. I am interested in the parallel of the creation of nation states in the nineteenth century in part to impose a common rule of economic law, and the creation of such supranational organisations such the WTO which are imposing a parallel rule of law across nation states.

Another theme is the possibility of convergence: whether globalisation forces countries to adopt common policies and eliminates cultural differences, or whether some independence, some choice of national living style, is possible.

Some countries are likely to appear prominently. For instance I expect to pay particular attention to the history of Germany, whose nation state is a creation of nineteenth century globalisation, and yet the same processes may have modified it out of recognition by the end of the twenty-first century. Intriguingly German culture is at least 500 years old, and seems likely to outlast Germany as we know it. Another interesting example is Canada whose trading relationship makes it an integral part of the North American economy, and yet the country maintains a nation state and a separate identity. It appears to be a contradiction of the inevitably of convergence. If I have time I’d also like to look at the Pacific Islands in a globalising world. (Australia, and Geoffrey Blainey’s notion ‘the tyranny of distance’, is of course an integral part of the study.) I am also interested in the diaspora as a globalisation phenomenon which maintains a national culture while becoming physically, if not emotionally, detached from a location. I hope we can do some work on the New Zealand one.

There are many relevant topics I will not have time to study. For instance, diminishing costs of distance has altered diplomacy as is evident by the way that MFAT has changed its operations over the years. Militarily, the invasion of Iraq is a very different logistic operation from the sort of thing which happened under the nineteenth century British Empire.

I mention also that the Marsden Grant, generous as it is in New Zealand terms, only funds some of my time. I am hoping to use some of the unpaid time for practical contract work relevant to the general project. One of the great advantages of being a consultant is the stimulus one gets from such projects. I have two underway at the moment.

The Marsden criteria includes a requirement that the research program should include an element of technology transfer. If my past record is an indication, there will be a number of publications, but the import of the Marsden requirements is that there should also be person-to-person transfer (an issue, incidentally, which is important in globalisation since the requirements of such personal intimacy limit the effectiveness of, say, electronic communications.) But because I have no academic sinecure I dont have graduates students or departmental colleagues to practice such a transfer.

Instead I proposed to Marsden that I would establish a New Zealand Centre for Globalisation Studies, to enable all New Zealand academics to participate in a broader research program. It will be a virtual, web-based centre which I hope will enable all academics interested in the phenomenon to participate, irrespective of where they are based: universities, research institutes, and independent scholars. Those outside the country will also be welcome to be involved, and hopefully it will become an interface between the New Zealand academy and the rest of the world in this multi-disciplinary area. Participants will not have to buy into my research framework of diminishing distance. Instead, the centre should attract scholars from all relevant disciplines and encourage mutual intercourse within and between disciplines and institutions, thereby enhancing the national research effort on globalisation, including in those areas about which I have not the time or inclination to pursue.

Unfortunately, there is not much funding for the Centre, only enough for a web-master, plus my time (which means less of it for research). But perhaps the Centre is an experiment, a test of the central thesis that distance is changing the way the world relates and can relate. I expect an announcement about the formal establishment of the Centre early in the year, but there will some public activity before then. You may want to note I have reserved www.nzglobalisation.ac.nz as the website.

In the interim, you can keep in touch via my website where you will also find, among other things, my published work on my globalisation research program, and further details of the Marsden application and grant, which will help me progress it.

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Strange Benchmates

Why does the Left hang together and the Right hang separately?
Listener 29 November, 2003.

Keywords: Political Economy & History;

Despite it being 10 years since a referendum committed New Zealand to MMP, many commentators still think in terms of the old winner-takes-all (WTA) regime. They suggested that voters were illogical because in last year’s election Labour won more of the list vote in many National-won seats. But seats are still won on a WTA basis, so the shrewd elector –– apparently smarter than many commentators –– gave their electorate vote to the least objectionable front-runner. So those who were anti-Labour tended to vote National.

However, when they came to their list vote, knowing that almost every vote would contribute to Parliament’s composition, the Right split their vote among Act, National, New Zealand First and United Future (although, as I shall explain, the latter voters had even more complicated strategic objectives).

Yes, there is still a strong left-right dimension in New Zealand politics. Those who say there is not haven’t been paying attention to the electorate. (Those who think they know exactly what the dimension means haven’t being paying attention, either.) But the intriguing implication of last year’s election was that voters are willing to compromise their left-right politics for political stability. This may explain why National is doing so badly in the polls. While Labour continues to hold a commanding 40 plus percent of voters, National dithers in the 20s.

The voters’ biggest objection to MMP was that it would result in weak minority and coalition governments. That was also the regime’s strength, for governments could not ignore the voters’ wishes by imposing unpopular policies without consultation. (The argument detailed in my book The Whimpering of the State also points out that imposition without consultation results in poor-quality policy because there are fewer mechanisms to identify and correct mistakes.)

Perhaps Helen Clark’s most impressive political achievement has been to provide strong government, even though she has only a minority in Parliament. Fairness adds that so did Jim Bolger after 1993, although he was toppled in 1998, in part because of his success, for the desire of his party was to pursue more vigorous, less consultative, policies. The following Jenny Shipley government moved sharply to the right. Labour filled the vacuum in the centre. When Shipley tried to move the party back into the Bolger location, she found the space taken.

Labour further seized the initiative, with its 1999 pact with the Alliance, which offered the prospect of a stable coalition. It delivered, fortunately for parliamentary democracy, although in 2002 most of the Alliance walked out. This left the electorate with the dilemma –– which it has every election –– of how to obtain stable consultative government. The indications are that it wanted a return of a Labour-led centrist government, but it did not want it over-dependent on the Greens. The resolution was that a chunk of the Right voted for a centre-right party, United Future, which gave Labour the desired stable mandate, constrained by a consultation process with two flank parties (United Future and the Greens) and, by implication, all of us. (Such WTA attitudes prevail, Opposition parties still present themselves as uncritically opposing government policies, ignoring the opportunities MMP presents of influencing policy outcomes, and giving the impression that the Opposition is capable of consultative government.)

The result is that the Left have tended to vote together, because by doing so they command government, albeit they are constrained to an incrementalist centre-left policy rather than the radical-left policies many would prefer. However, Right voters have split into the four separate parties, which collectively command the allegiance of 40 plus percent of the vote.

The implication is that National will not get back to its 40 plus percent of the postwar era, and it may struggle for a sustainable 30 plus percent. It is even possible that another party will replace it as the lead party of the Right. (Certainly, Winston Peters has that ambition.) To win power, National has to convince the voters that it can form a coalition government with the radical-right Act, the populist New Zealand First and the Christian-based United Future. (Political ambition generates strange benchmates.)

When it does –– given the current leadership of the four parties, this may be some time in the future –– and Labour goes into Opposition, we are likely to see the Left splinter in the same way as the Right already has. Never let it be said that the New Zealand Left is less divided, less confused and less fractious than we currently see of the Right.

This column benefited from a draft of Voters’ Veto: The 2002 election in New Zealand and the consolidation of minority government (edited by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp & Raymond Miller), to be published by AUP in February 2004.

Treasury: the New Zealand Treasury 1840-2000, Malcolm Mckinnon

This is a much longer version of a review published in New Zealand Economic Papers, 37(1), December 2003 295-302.

Keywords: Governance; History of Ideas, Methodology & Philosophy; Political Economy & History;

Treasury Secretary from 1986 to 1993, Graham Scott, got it quite wrong when he said shortly after the 1987 election, ‘I’m interested in getting back to the old money-bags role, what Treasury did in the nineteenth century – the core of the finance ministry is its old functions. That’s our knitting.’ Historian Malcolm McKinnon is too polite to point out this is another example of an ahistorical economist misrepresenting the past. Except by his writing a history of the Treasury.

Only 50 of the 400 plus pages of Treasury are devoted to the nineteenth century, partly because of a lack of material, but also because the agency then is of limited interest. The Treasury is surely the oldest department of state: the contender is the Colonial Office (now the Department of Internal Affairs), also established in 1840, but since when did public bureaucrats work without getting paid? It is certainly the department which has retained its name the longest, although its functions have changed greatly over the years. McKinnon divides the book into three parts: Clerks 1840-1910, Accountants 1910-1961, and Economists 1961-.

The first (and longest) period has Treasury passively carrying out routine financial transactions, apparently giving little advice to its Minister. (Perhaps Robert Muldoon, rather than Scott, would have preferred a nineteenth century Treasury.) Some functions continued well into the twentieth century – the book describes Noel Lough learning to prepare (manually) some of the 200 odd cheques a day when he arrived in 1937 (‘The ledgers were at high desks on stools’) – until they were decentralised to individual government departments. Even so, there is a contemporary ring in the 1880 complaint that ‘serious inconvenience and loss of time is caused to surveyors, engineers, and others, who are imprest officers, by the amount of account-keeping thrust upon them’.

McKinnon argues persuasively that there was barely any ‘official’ advice given through this period. Records are skimpy of course, and there are hints that Jas Heyward, the long serving Secretary from 1890 to 1906, gained his Ministers’ confidence as an adviser. The chief executive’s title of ‘Assistant Treasurer’ (to the Colonial Treasurer) until the 1870s, indicates the low status. Even in the 1920s the Secretary’s career path was often promotion to the more prestigious and better paid Auditor Generalship.

Ironically then, nineteenth century decisions were made in a manner similar to which the populace thinks they are made today – by the politicians (Colonial Treasurer or Minister of Finance) with little input from officials. (How many times one does one tell an uniformed enquirer, that thinking about an issue goes back to officials’ ruminations months or years earlier than the ministerial announcement, and if they really want to pontificate they ought to make an OIA enquiry for the relevant papers?)

Many readers, interested only in contemporary issues, will skip the early chapters. But there is an interest, nicely captured by John Hicks’ thought that there was merit in each term getting the students to write their essays from a different past approach to economics, in turn physiocrat, mercantilist, classical, Marxist, … Hicks was after an ability to use different paradigms and to be robust enough intellectually to be able to see through them to the underlying economic issues, the suppleness of mind that characterised his Oxford graduates, which, alas, is given no great priority in today’s teaching. The history of the Treasury continually faces the reader with policy responses arising from institutional differences such as external monetary and banking arrangements. It would be useful, for instance, if those who would advocate a monetary union with the Australian or US currencies, recognised that New Zealand was in a sterling union for over half its history, and explained why the reasons for abandonment in the 1930s are no longer relevant. (Perhaps the advocates do really want to take New Zealand back to the nineteenth century.)

Readers may be disappointed that McKinnon was not able to uncover any evidence of financial corruption among officials in the nineteenth century or later (politicians were less scrupulous), nor anything as sensational as the British nineteenth (CHX) century Treasury Secretary who threw himself out of an upper story window a week after his appointment. The closest is whether the actions of some officials during the early part of 1984 were constitutionally improper. (See pages 318-319.)

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McKinnon identifies from about 1910 a transformation in the function of the Treasury towards accountancy similar to the Gladstonian revolution in the Britain in the 1860s, arguing that the ‘revolution was grounded in a political economy of strict parliamentary control of public spending, with Treasury as a “constable on the block”.’ If McKinnon is correct – a simpler explanation is the British innovation took time to reach these shores – there is much to be explored about the growing power of parliament in this period. Whatever, t a change there was, as holders of diplomas of accountancy began to proliferate. The book identifies this phase as lasting through to 1961 (although of course every historian is always tentative about such clear cut divisions in time), devoting just over a hundred pages to the fifty years.

The Secretaries are becoming persons now. McKinnon instances George Campbell (1913-1922) who was president of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (a Wellington representative rugby player, he was the Secretary closest to being an All Black, although a later one took ballet lessons); James (called ‘John’ in the illustration on page 75) Esson (1922-25) who became the Grand Master of the Order of Freemasons, retired to become a political power in the land, and died with an estate the equivalent today of $600,000; while Alexander Park (1930-1935) was Esson’s executor. (A nice touch that, what economist would have thought to chase up Secretaries’ wills?)

An entire chapter is devoted to the Great Depression. Here, and elsewhere, McKinnon is ill-served by the economists failure to have a comprehensive and authoritative of New Zealand’s economic history. McKinnon does not get it wrong, but a framework of economic history would have added to his account.

I, like Scott, got a part of the Treasury’s history wrong, or rather I now have a more precise understanding of that history. My first mea culpa is that I have argued that the history of the Treasury is one of fiscal stress, extreme fiscal stress, or intolerable fiscal stress. I now know that for over half its life fiscal stress failed to impinge upon the Treasury because it was not a fiscal manager. It certainly impacted on the Ministers who were responsible so, for instance, the reputation Harry Atkinson has suffered, for he presided during the Long Depression of the 1880s when the primary concern was to restrain government spending as revenue contracted and foreign loan sources dried up. Still the ‘stress, stress, stress’ principle – that there is always fiscal stress and it shapes the modern Treasury – remains valid.

I knew that the vision of the Treasury as eternally the most powerful department of state arising out of its fiscal management was wrong. I had noticed that the 1928 National Industrial Conference called by Prime Minister Gordon Coates – the first of the talkfests that have littered the last 75 years – was attended by politicians, businessmen (yes, no women at all), five professors of economics (more than would today), and the heads of all the relevant government departments (CHX). But there was nary a sign of a Treasury official, inconceivable as that would be today. This led me to formulate the hypothesis that the longest serving Secretary, Bernard Ashwin, founded the modern Treasury. It is now evident that he was a more transitional figure, presaging what would happen, although he remains the most important public servant of the 1939 to 1955 period when he was Secretary (and possibly the seven years earlier). Keith Sinclair, more modestly, describes him as one of the four powers in the land in the 1940s (with Peter Fraser, Walter Nash and Fintan Patrick Walsh).

I should have picked up a clue from the valued memoirs of Geoff Schmitt, who described a typical workday in Ashwin’s life beginning at the office 9am (he may have been talking to Fraser after midnight), ensuring things were going well, and then at about 10am going off to a series of meetings for the rest of the day, presumably leaving the rest of the Treasury sorting their cheques and vouchers. Ashwin’s power came from his talent, rather than from the power of the Treasury per se. The development of economic policy advice and management in New Zealand begins with those professors of economics and a handful of professional advisers (Dick Campbell, Horace Belshaw and Ashwin – Bill Sutch, is there but a decade younger), through the Economic Stabilisation Commission (Ashwin was its first chair) to the Treasury only in the early 1950s (around a group of young men – Noel Lough, Henry Lang, Jim Moriarty and Schmitt who were mentored by Ashwin). Lurking behind this book is an account of the history of New Zealand economics – with the rise of the Victoria University College economics department playing a crucial role.

This takes nothing away from Ashwin’s achievements. Possibly the earliest masters economics graduate of Victoria University College (he missed out on a first by a poor commercial law mark – no great sin for an economist), he was the first economist among the Treasury’s accountants, and the only one for almost two decades. His significant intellectual skills were supplemented by personal charisma and judgement beyond his years. (He is the youngest Secretary of the Treasury, Murray Horne excepted.) However, lest I be accused of the ‘great man in history syndrome’ – a misreading of my The Nationbuilders, which used biography to describe a historical process – he was not irreplaceable. Had his First World I bullet been inches more fatal, my guess is that Dick Campbell or Belshaw (or someone who copped the bullet) would have been an adequate replacement.

McKinnon describes Ashwin as a ‘Keynesian’, by which he means, I think, someone prone to intervention at the macro- and micro-economic levels. I doubt that Ashwin, trained in the 1920s, was Keynesian in the technical sense. Although he would have met Keynes at Bretton Woods, I doubt he ever read The General Theory. (Sutch reviewed it months after it was published.) There is an interesting ‘back-of-the envelope’ calculation by Ashwin in 1939 in which he assesses the available foreign currency and the employment implications, the precursor of the balance-of-payments-constrained economy model which the Treasury – especially Schmidt – developed in the early 1950s. Ashwin was the only economist in the Treasury in 1939, so he probably invented it himself, extending the fiscal calculations, which almost certainly go back to the nineteenth century, of the government revenue and loans available for spending to the economy as a whole. In which case Ashwin is thinking like a Keynesian, albeit an open economy one, who assesses the impact of the government’s accounts on the economy as a whole.

Ashwin’s great love was money and banking – described as the ‘father and mother’ of the Reserve Bank he demurred, but when he retired he left a vacuum in its Board. His micro-economic interests were more limited. I recall my shock at coming across an inter-departmental paper on transport subsidies for fertilizer, signed off by him which had no mention of their efficiency effects, the focus being entirely on the fiscal implications – ‘stress, stress, stress’. It would, however, be ahistorical to expect an economist trained in the 1920s, working near a weak local university economics department, to be familiar with the welfare developments of the 1930s and later.

The point of the theoretical reflections in the last paragraphs is they are not there in the book. McKinnon is a conventional historian, not one of the history of ideas (let alone of economic ideas). On the other hand there is little literature from economists he could have called upon. In the interim until the gap is filled, we need to recognise that Ashwin, a survivor from the Depression, and his colleagues and immediate successors, were thinking about the economy from a quite different perspective from today. Hicks would approve.

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Aswhin retired in 1955, the longest serving Secretary but still only 59. I suggested it was exhaustion plus the prospect of a successful private sector career which determined the decision. McKinnon records rumours that he fell out with the Prime Minister Sydney Holland although he recommended Ashwin’s title. Ashwin is unique among Secretaries to be knighted, and only he and Lang are entries in The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (although at least one of those alive today will appear in a future volume).

There is an interregnum after Ashwin, for his immediate successors were not as outstanding, and McKinnon assigns the rest of the 1950s to the ‘accountants’. His new age dawns in 1961, shortly after Lang returns from a period as London Treasury officer, whose main function was to rise and manage loans. Lang had two advantages over Ashwin. He had Ashwin as a mentor. (Who was Ashwin’s mentor? Possibly Esson.) And in England he observed the British Treasury and, no doubt, came home with some sort of like model in mind. (McKinnon pays much attention to Treasury developments overseas – especially in Australia and Britain.) Like Ashwin there was a period before Lang became Secretary in 1967, when he drove Treasury thinking from a lower level – notably the tea-room chats. The irony is that the man who presided over the first phase of the ‘Economics’ period of the Treasury was a graduate in accounting and philosophy and was always careful to disclaim being an economist. Yet he built up the economics cadre in the Treasury on Ashwin’s foundations, to the point they became dominant. (No Secretary since Lang has lacked a degree in economics, but only two of the six also claimed accounting qualifications.)

The final half of the book is about the Lang and post-Lang treasury. It is a different sort of history now, because the records are richer, the department is in the public eye and hence the journalistic record, and many of those involved are still alive. (There were 55 who recorded oral interviews.) Contemporary history is a difficult exercise if only to distant the writer from the event. McKinnon does it well, although there will be further attempts to write the history of the period. While the future accounts will be welcome, what must be resisted that only insiders really knew what is going on and their esoteric knowledge is all that matters. McKinnon’s account is likely to remain long the framework on which future re-writers will base their works.

To review the period, I make here four general points. The first is that the Lang Treasury was driven by a man – like Ashwin – of great ability and natural charisma. (His ‘children’ remain loyal to him. One chased me down the street to say my portrait in Nationbuilders was faithful.) He left a Treasury in his image, but one which none of his successors could manage. The policy revolution of the early 1980s emanating out of Economics II, the think tank, arose in part because Lang was not there to control it. Perhaps with the growth of staff numbers the task was impossible anyway. New management systems and styles were developed.

Second, the revolution also arose out of evolution in economic theory of the time. We are still too close to it to see it clearly – there may be already another underway led by the role of information in economic decisions if Joseph Stiglitz is right – although surely Treasury grasped an extreme version of the neo-classical/rational expectations synthesis of the time, and one which was already a little out of date. (The next time you are told that Treasury simply took the standard paradigm on the day recall, Keynes’ remark about practical men being dependent on defunct economists.)

Third, we should never under-estimate the degree of fiscal stress in the 1970s. Coupled with inflation, the economy was not functioning well (although it was growing in the late 1970s and earl 1980s faster than the OECD average). Ironically, the inflation funded the deficit by expropriating the real value of the private sector’s holdings of government debt. (Real interest rates were negative and tax was levied on nominal interest rates.) Much of the 1980’s policy was concerned with easing the stress: the tax reforms; the privatisations and other commercialisations; the new modes of controlling government expenditures; even the new accounting systems. But the post-1984 period was also a period of fiscal laxity if the rise in government debt is any indication. Admittedly some of the debt arose from shifting the consequences of the Muldoon administration from below to above the line, but it would have been higher had not there been no sales of government assets. What seems to have happened is that the Treasury (and its political masters?) were willing to incur short-term deficits in belief that they would have long-term benefits – as in the case of the income tax reforms being net fiscal losers to make them palatable (the immediate losses being disguised by phasing effects). Even so, there is the extraordinary sentence in Economic Management invites fiscal irresponsibility, and one cannot help wondering whether the Reagan induced US deficits of the same time generated an unfortunate degree of insobriety. As for the current Bush ones, one is left with the uneasy feeling that right-wing deficits are justified and left-wing ones are not (just as in the hypocrisy of the nuclear standoff, the weapons of mass destruction were justified by the political colour of their possessors). There is much more to be explored here, and no doubt will. My concerns are not merely the impositions on future generations from higher government debt, but the way the internal deficit impacts upon the external deficit, the exchange rate, the tradeable sector and ultimately the growth prospects of the economy.

The fourth point is that the reforms had considerable distributional impacts. (Indeed the fiscal deficit does not get under control until the 1990/1991 packages which were at the expense of the poor, although it took a few years for the control to become apparent because the packages precipitated a macro-economic contraction.) Modern economics is peculiarly inept in dealing with redistributional impacts, even though they tend to be much greater than the efficiency gains. Politicians want to know about both, but advice tends to stress the latter and ignore the former – much to the political costs of the politicians. McKinnon is interested in the social origins of Treasury officials and tells of how earlier ones were of humble origins, but that increasingly their backgrounds have become privileged. Is this a hint that as the department gained power it became disconnected from ordinary New Zealanders?

The last point, like the rest of those in this section, is a meditation arising out of the book. McKinnon will have done economics a service if others are provoked to meditate too, or to add their memoirs and commentaries. (Send a copy to McKinnon, care of the Public History Section of the Ministry of Cultural and Heritage to add to the already substantial raw material he has built up for future scholars.)

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This is a handsomely produced book, with detailed references (which I kept referring to) and bibliography. Added to his Independence and Foreign Policy and his editorship of The New Zealand Historical Atlas, it marks McKinnon as one of our major historians. The book itself is a milestone in public history of government departments, rich with many details which commonly got overlooked in the plodders of the past. I liked the attention to the details like where the Treasury was located, its size and composition, and the stories of the humdrum life of clerks.

The disappointments are the pictures, probably because McKinnon was overseas when the selection was made. Some are telling, such as those from the collection of John Anderson capturing the everyday and recreational life of Treasury. Others are irrelevant, missing that the story is about official advisers and not politicians. What is the point of a picture of Muldoon and Margaret Thatcher together?

Some of the classic cartoons of the 1980s and 1990s are there – Tom Scott’s one of the son having ‘absolutely no grasp on reality’ could have a career as a Treasury economist. They remind us of the way Treasury was seem when it became prominent in the public eye. But none captures the genially subversive side of Treasury officials, like having been told by its Minister, David Caygill, that the place was a bit of a monastery, one official promenaded as a monk. I’d have also liked that poster of Muldoon as the ‘Gross National Product’ which appeared around Treasury in the early 1980s, reminding us that while the majority of Treasury officials remained loyal to the principles of a public adviser, they had their own principles too.

The saddest pictorial mistake is the label for the front cover which shows the current Treasury building with part of the Brett Graham sculpture ‘The Navigator’ in front (the waka bit actually, although it is known as the ‘banana’). There is no mention that the sculpture rests in the Henry Lang Memorial Park, the only public recognition of a New Zealand Treasury secretary, perhaps the only one of its kind in the world. (What would be a suitable monument for Ashwin, or McIntosh, or Beeby?)

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Normally one completes a biography reflecting on the significance of the life portrayed. But the New Zealand Treasury is still alive, so the relevant reflection may be its prospects. The dominant message is that it has been a living organism adapting to its economic and political environment. Its future will depend upon how that environment changes. That is why Graham Scott’s hope that the Treasury would return to its (mid-twentieth century) knitting of managing the government accounts is misleading.

A Treasury could opt out of all macroeconomic and microeconomic policy issues which do not pertain to the public account. It would forecast the economy for fiscal purposes, but give no advice on macro-economic management, and where microeconomic issues did not impinge directly on the accounts – say in competitions policy – it could avoid comment. It is conceivable, but unlikely, not least because it would be a peculiar minister who was uninterested in such issues. (Historically the Treasury has had an exceptionally strong series of ministers since Gordon Coates, all ranked near the top of cabinet, except Muldoon when he first took over because of his youth, and Harry Lake fresh into cabinet in 1960 was ranked sixth behind already established ministers.)

It is not impossible that a strong non-Treasury minister could build up a countervailing department, although the recent experience of the Ministries of Economic Development and Social Development – both potential challengers to Treasury dominance – shows it is going to take years for them to develop the institutional structures, cadres and morale which Ashwin and Lang evolved (and which the publication of this book reinforces). In any case, as long as it is responsible for the fisc the Treasury remains in the centre of the political and government process. That requires a high quality staff, including economists who are going to have opinions – and give advice – on matters wider than the government accounts.

In the last pages of the book, McKinnon hints of the possibility of a Minister walking away from her or his department, describing in 2000 the ‘relationship between department and government [as] particularly jagged’. There is the Coatesian option, which Paul Keating also took when he became minister for the Australian Treasury headed by John Stone in 1983, of having a thinktank attached to the ministerial office, and leaving the routines to the Treasury. The fear of such a possibility ought to lead to a degree of responsiveness to ministerial sensitivities by a department. Ashwin seems not to have been the only Secretary to move on as a result of tensions with the minister: Lang in 1976; Bernard Galvin in 1986. High quality leaders seem likely to lead to high quality clashes of temperament. (The nightmare Treasury faces would be a Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, neither of whom were fiscal conservatives. The closest since the 1920s was Norman Kirk who was offset by the doughty Bill Rowling.)

The institutional challenge that faces Treasury may come from the academy’s concern with the quality of its work. Just as the plainest princess is said to be pretty and the dullest prince has his commonplace pronouncements raised to profundity and wit, the political power of the Treasury – together with its generous funding – means no one dares challenges their claims to excellence. And yet one is continually struck how pedestrian is much of its policy advice, how backward its ‘research’.

To give but one example. In the late 1980s I connected with the Australian debate about its relative ranking in the OECD production stakes. It was a small step to New Zealand-Australian per capita GDP comparisons and I published about the inferior performance as early as 1993, and in learned articles shortly after. Paul Dalziel repeated the comparisons from 1998, and the NZIER in 2000. In 2002 the Treasury came to the same conclusion, with no reference to any of the earlier studies. There are many other such examples. Were Treasury staffed by physicists they would shortly put in a patent for the wheel.

If its bibliographies are any indication, the Treasury seems to have a rule of scrupulously ignoring any New Zealand research (in exceptional circumstances it may include papers by acolytes). This is a mark of mediocrity rather than excellence, of an inability to take up the challenges posed by quality minds. The impression is reinforced by obsequiousness to foreign research (which is sometimes misinterpreted, and often irrelevant). Admittedly Treasury faces a terrible dilemma explaining the economy’s last two decades because the government followed past advisers, and the outcomes were vastly inferior from the promises. Existing Treasury officials, many of whom were in school when the advice was given, today carry the burden of the failed policies, for the institution lives even if the staff it move on. But if today’s staff do not reflect on the past, and give an account consistent with it, they are likely to repeat its mistakes.

That is the power of this book. Treasury, who sponsored it, acknowledges it has a past and while the study is primarily a political and institutional history, even the Treasury economist as out of touch with reality as the Tom Scott cartoon claims, will recognise there is an economic history and a history of economic ideas lurking below the text. The academy has every incentive to assist them. (It has yet to fully appreciate the power of the Official Information Act as a research tool. Galvin was right to fear the act for the way it could allow independent assessment of the quality of Treasury advice.)

McKinnon concludes his magisterial account with ‘[i]n sum, not only Treasury’s professionalism but its politics survived: the three legs of the [nineteenth century British Treasury] tripod, the Reserve Bank Act (the ‘gold standard’), the Fiscal Responsibility Act (‘the balanced Budget’) and microeconomic reform (‘Free trade’) all remained more, or less, intact.’ Narrow economists will ponder on the notion of progress in the profession: the wider public will note there is no reference to the welfare of the nation, the economic analysis of which developed from the 1920s, unemployment (the 1930s) or economic growth (the 1950s).

Brian Easton was one of the many consulted in Malcolm McKinnon’s preparation of the text.

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Old Money: if Life Expectancy Is Rising, Should the Age for the Pension Rise, to

Listener 15 November, 2003.

Keywords: Social Policy;

In 1998 our life expectancy at 65 was 17.6 years, so over half those who go onto New Zealand superannuation pass their 80th birthday. In 1898, when the much less generous Old Age Pension was introduced, life expectancy at the 65-year-old age of eligibility was 13 years. Over the century the average life expectancy at 65 has increased by almost five years. Can the state pension be as relatively generous as longevity increases?

Consider Robinson Crusoe, castaway at age 25. Suppose that he is capable of collecting 30 nuts a year. He wants to retire in 40 years when he turns 65, and suppose that he knows he will live exactly 10 more years after retirement. He calculates that in the 40 working years he collects 1200 (40×30) nuts. But because of his 50-year life he can consume only 24 (1200/50) nuts a year. While productive, he must save a fifth of his income if he desires a comfortable retirement.

Suppose that he learns he is going to live 20 years after retirement. He collects the same number of nuts while working, but now he can consume only 20 (1200/60) nuts a year, because he has to provide for 10 extra years. So he saves a third of his income for his retirement, and his consumption during his working life is correspondingly lower.

What about interest? Suppose that Robinson invests his nuts with Man Friday. It is not necessary to show the calculations. The simple point is that Friday has fewer nuts after he pays interest to Robinson. Interest shifts the entitlement to consume between people. Its effect on average consumption is negligible.

Admittedly, Friday may have shrewdly used the nuts for some other purpose (planting easier-to-harvest trees?). Economic growth complicates the calculations, but as long as the retired expect to share in any prosperity, the broad analysis is the same. If the retirement pension was set at its 1898 rate (eligibility was highly selective then) and adjusted only for inflation, the state pension scheme would face no great pressures. Unlike the elderly, since the pension would be $50 a week today. (It was seven shillings a week then.)

What about setting up a pension system, in which people contribute to a fund that pays out the retired? Suppose that five workers paid five nuts into the fund, which gave them to a retired Robinson. (There would be much paper work to obscure this, but the reality is that they are producing saving, and spending nuts – real goods and services.) Everyone’s consumption would be 25 nuts. Problem solved.

However, to work in perpetuity, the scheme requires five collectors for each of the five when they retire, a total of 25, and when those 25 retire there will have to be 125, and … Viability of this pension system requires high population growth. When the growth slows down, the scheme is not viable. In most Western nations, population growth has stagnated, and the private and state pension funds are no longer viable, though various magical money illusions are temporarily hiding how desperate things are.

New Zealand, demographically younger, has the same looming problem, although perhaps not yet as acutely. As we live longer there are more oldies, and as we have fewer children there are relatively fewer workers. We are going to run out of sufficient nuts. The irresponsible strategy is a possum sitting on the road with the headlights a long way away, hoping to be dead by the time the truck runs over us all.

Perhaps we should gradually raise the age of entitlement for New Zealand super. The problem is the politics. Suppose, following interparty negotiations, it was agreed to increase (say, by three months every year) the age of entitlement until it reached the point where life expectancy was 15 years. (The age of 70 would be reached in 2026.) Also, there would be less generous provision for those under retirement age who could not work and had inadequate savings, just as there is today. The policy would come into effect after the next election, and sufficient parties (including, ideally, Labour and National) would promise to enact the provisions after the election, irrespective of whether they were in government or not, to ensure it passed.

Nobody currently in receipt of a state pension will be worse off, so the policy would have little immediate electoral impact. This is why sufficient of the political parties could co-operate, favouring the long-term gains of sustainability with negligible short-term losses. The difficulty with the strategy is that implementation requires statesmen and stateswomen – on both sides of Parliament – not politicians or possums.

Competitive Edges: What the New Wave Of Trade Theory Can Teach New Zealand.

Listener: 1 November, 2003.

Keywords: Globalisation & Trade;

Does it strike you as odd that we drink wine and eat cheeses from Europe and yet New Zealand exports them there? Or that Germans drive Renaults and the French drive Volkswagens? The phenomenon puzzled economists, too. Renaults and Volkswagens are different cars, but they are not that different. Neither the German nor French economies would collapse if they could not import cars: perhaps local manufacturers would make the foreign models, although substantial economies of scale keep the costs of this specialisation down (and diminishing costs of distance make the inter-regional trade possible). Consumers would be only marginally worse off.

For 200 years, international trade theory was based on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage of “inter-industry trade” in which unlike was traded for unlike – cloth from England for wine from Portugal. Nowadays there is “intra-industry trade” of like with almost like, which totals roughly a quarter of world trade, up from zero 50 years ago. (The other roughly equal parts are oil for anything, commodities for manufacture and inter-industry trade.)

There are other strange un-Ricardian phenomena. The components from foreign sources are combined into a complex product, some of which is exported back to the component suppliers. So Italians export suits back to us made from our wool. It is even unclear sometimes which country makes some products. Robert Reich reports in his 1991 The Work of Nations that there was more US content in the Hondas sold in the US than in the Fords. The balance may have changed, such is the kaleidoscope of trading linkages at the firm level.

Odder still is the existence of international firms located in non-obvious countries. Why is mobile-phone maker Nokia located in Finland? Why should we have a successful whiteware exporter such as Fisher & Paykel?

Over the last three decades economists have been rebuilding trade theory. Some of its components have been mentioned: economies of scale, product differentiation, the death of distance. (Paul Krugman is its best-known theorist.) Another crucial factor, summarised in the term “competitive advantage”, in contrast to “comparative advantage”, is ongoing innovativeness. Nokia, Fisher & Paykel, or whoever, survive because they are creative at staying ahead of their international competitors.

The precise policy implications are not clear. But first we need to recognise the phenomenon. Successful businesses already do. Otherwise, they would have long gone to the wall. Our public policy seems less aware of these new trading patterns. Its focus remains on comparative advantage, not least because of our strength in primary-product industries based on natural resources that are cruelly restricted in the markets of those who talk free trade, walk protection, and dump their surpluses into New Zealand’s third markets. There is absolutely nothing in the New Trade Theory that says comparative advantage is wrong. It just says it is incomplete – increasingly incomplete given the higher growth rate of intra-industry trade. Some of the primary-product exporters participate in intra-industry trade. Organs from cows and sheep are the base for pharmaceutical exports.

The standard case against commodity exporting is that its relative prices tend to fall in the long run. But firms with high rates of productivity gains can compensate for weakening prices, as the computer industry demonstrates. That is why the New Zealand dairy industry managed to survive in the postwar era. Its productivity gains kept farmers facing falling relative prices in business, even though the main beneficiaries were foreign consumers. Recently, and fortunately, it seems the trend of relative prices (the terms of trade) for our primary products has been stable or even rising – wool excepted. The Uruguay trade-negotiations round (which preceded the current Doha round) may have limited some of the price depressing protectionism.

We need not be too pessimistic about public policy. The keystone of the government’s economic strategy, “growth and innovation framework” (GIF), gives some attention to competitive advantage. Over time, we will better incorporate the new economic-theory developments as the practices they describe impinge. However, only with Australia do we have an effective intra-industry trade relationship. With other OECD economies, we have markedly lower intra-industry trade, so much so that we are at the bottom of the rankings of those countries for which we have measures. Yet, as the GIF framework recognises, intra-industry trade can drive growth in New Zealand. We need to factor this analysis into both our international trade strategy and our industrial assistance.

Brian Easton is on the Growth and Innovation Board that provides a private-sector perspective to the Prime Minister and Cabinet on the GIF. The column is, however, Brian’s personal analysis.

Report on the Social Costs Of Alcohol Abuse Workshop:

Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse, October 24-25th, 2003.

Keywords: Health;

The conference was centred around the launching of a study commissioned by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health to assess the costs in Switzerland of alcohol misuse, prepared by a team from the Economics Department of the Université de Neuchâtel, led by Professor Claude Jeanrenaud. Additionally, a number of international experts were invited to give papers on broader issues. The report International Guidelines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse (2ed), written by some of these experts and just published by the World Health Organisation was, in effect, also launched. This report highlights and reflects upon some of the papers presented at the conference.

Leaving aside a large amount of interesting institutional material about Switzerland (including that criminal activity is very low – its taxation framework will be mentioned below), the Swiss study is particularly valuable because it has paid considerable to the issues of measurement of the intangibles than most, and progressed the measurement of intangibles. Particularly valuable has been attempts to measure reductions in the quality of life by surveying individuals’ (contingent) valuations. This belongs to the willingness-to-pay approach which I and The Guidelines favour, but advances the method. There is no doubt that the third edition of The Guidelines (the revision is likely to begin in 2005) will pay considerable attention to this work. (Other papers from the Neuchâtel team collected other useful data for social costs studies, such as on employment, although the precise magnitudes may not be internationally transferrable.)

I do not propose to report upon the overall study estimates. Claude Jeanrenaud attempted to compare them with other studies in other countries. It is evident that there is still considerable variation in the application of the Guidelines which continue to make international comparisons difficult. My impression is the costs of alcohol misuse in Switzerland are in the middle of other Western Countries for which data is available. The study has to be seen in a context of the Swiss turning their attention to the misuse, them being at an earlier stage of developing a strategy than New Zealand.

Two groups of papers(there were 18 altogether) grabbed my attention. Developments in Australia are particularly important to New Zealand. Helen Lapsley and David Collins reported on their work estimating of the costs of attributable crime to alcohol misuse. This represents a major development over the last decade, for earlier the task was though impracticable. Even now criminology does not have the sophisticated ‘attributable fractions’ that epidemiology currently provides, and Lapsley and Collins were involved in a tedious process of working with criminologists to derive workable estimates. It turns out that while there is some ambiguity (as when there is co-dependance between alcohol and illicit drugs) it is clear that the social costs of alcohol attributable crime are significant – amounting to about .2 percent of Australian GDP. Applying that to New Zealand we should add perhaps a further $200m to my annual costs of alcohol misuse in New Zealand.

The other Collins and Lapsley paper drew attention to their low – almost zero – estimates of net costs to the health system of alcohol use, and a correspondingly low reduction in human capital in Australia. These differ significantly from my estimates for New Zealand, arising from different counterfactual assumptions. My counterfactual assumed that there was no alcohol misuse, whereas the Australian study assumes there is no alcohol consumption at all. Since modest levels of alcohol consumption have been found to be beneficial to health and longevity, their zero consumption assumption eliminates these benefits. The low net costs to health and human capital are not consequence of any economics, but of the epidemiological research, with the economics hilighting its finding. The conclusion emphasises the tension which alcohol policy has faced for some decades, when it was recognised that all alcohol consumption need not be detrimental (although in the past the assumption it had been assumed that modest consumption was generally neutral to health, whereas more recently epidemiologists have identified a mild net benefit).

What constitutes ‘modest’ consumption depends on circumstances. In the case of pregnant women modest consumption levels are thought to be zero. A telling paper by Ric Harwood evaluated the costs of a case of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) – arguably the most common (known) non-genetic cause of mental retardation. Harwood, one of the most cautious in the team which developed the Guidelines, estimated the lifetime costs of a child suffering FAS as around $US750,000 in the United States. The figure would not be as high for New Zealand, but it suggests that, say, a $250,000 prevention program which stopped but one case of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome would be economically justified. (Rates for FAS are usually though to be about 1 per 1000 live births, but the figure is subject to a large margin of error. This might suggest there are about 50 cases of FAS a year in New Zealand, plus further children who suffer some other (milder) fetal alcohol effects.)

A second paper by Donald Kenkel and Tsui-Fang Lin also examined FAS and looked at the impact of pregnancy and taxes on women’s alcohol use. It found that pregnant women reduced their alcohol consumption (on average by half), an effect reinforced by higher excise duties. Since it is not practical to raise duties only on pregnant women, the research’s policy conclusion might be that pregnant women are receptive to the notion they can improve their babies’ health by lowering – and eliminating altogether – their alcohol consumption during pregnancy.

My presented paper, The Economic Regulation of Alcohol Consumption in New Zealand ended the conference, nicely balancing the opening paper which was a plea from the Swiss Federal Office for Public Health, for more assistance to the development of public policy to reduce alcohol misuse and its consequences. Alas, Swiss constitutional arrangements preclude the use of excise duty in a manner similar to that in New Zealand. (I can also report that there was some amazement – even envy – that the policy recommendations in a scholarly work like my report Taxing Harm could be implemented within six months. I explained that treasuries with the constitutional power like to deal with tax loopholes quickly.)

In the dinner of the international experts after the conference, considerable interest and support was expressed for the principle of using excise duties on alcohol primarily for the purpose of minimizing harm. This has been stated as a policy position in New Zealand cabinet papers (with the caveat there is also a revenue raising role to cover the social costs of alcohol misuse) although, as my paper argues, it is yet to be integrated into officials’ policy thinking. In the general discussion which followed, the experts urged that this approach be pursued and bedded in, and at least one remarked that New Zealand led the world. They hoped our leadership would enable their countries to adopt a similar policy framework.

Conclusions and Directions

(1) The growing evidence of mild health benefits from modest levels of alcohol consumption supports the New Zealand policy approach on the focussing of minimizing harm (including drinking which causes harm) rather than attempting to reduce aggregate alcohol consumption.

(2) There was a general agreement with the New Zealand approach of using excise duties on alcohol primarily for the purpose of minimizing harm together with a revenue raising role to cover the social costs of alcohol misuse.

(3) Priority areas in the development of estimation of the social costs of substance abuse appear to be
– improved application of common principles for international comparisons;
– better estimates of the willingness to pay for valuing intangible costs;
– more work on, and the incorporation into aggregates, of the costs of alcohol attributable crime;
– and, of course, more data.

(4) Preventing cases of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (and the other, albeit lesser damaging, foetal alcohol effects) would appear to give a very high return on social investment.

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Attendence at the conference was made possible by grants from the Economics Department of the Université de Neuchâtel and the Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand: Te Kaunihera Whakatupato Waipiro o Aotearoa. I am most grateful to both institutions and to the host Claude Jeanrenaud and his support team. It is planned to publish the proceedings of the conference.