Notes for a Friend

Te Tiriti gave ‘kawanatanga’ (governance) to the Crown but ‘rangatiratanga’ to Iwi (I’ll come to a complication). ‘Sovereignty’ confuses the discussion because it could be either kawanatanga or rangatiratanga – the sovereignty of the state vs the sovereignty of the individual.

The governance vision in 1840 was a minimalist state. The 1852 constitution even allowed the possibility of separate Māori provinces. This was never pursued and in 1876, non-Māori provinces were gutted of serious power too. New Zealand became increasingly centralised, especially as geographic connectivity increased.

The centralised governance was underpinned by a majoritarianism which discounted, ignored and suppressed minorities. Māori could be largely ignored because most lived rurally.

What is happening today is that a whole range of minorities are objecting to majoritarianism. Interestingly the biggest ‘minority’, women, has been largely incorporated into the majority. (Gays and lesbians similarly.) But Māori have not been; yet following urbanisation they can no longer be ignored. That may be because they have a different agenda but also that those Māori whose demands have been met (and so have been incorporated) don’t speak up.

Some of the Māori solutions – including partnership (as some have interpreted it rather than as the Court of Appeal intended) and co-governance – involve centralisation and/or majoritarianism. Traditionally their Iwi were organised hierarchically (more below) which makes this option attractive to the elite. It was not coincidental that the chief advocate for co-governance was from the Kīngitanga.

However, neither is politically feasible (given that it is unacceptable to the existing majority) nor does it address the fundamental problem of multiple cultures trying to coexist. (More New Zealanders report allegiance to non-Māori, non-Pakeha ethnicity –e.g. Asian and Pasifika – than report Māori ethnicity.)

It seems to me that if New Zealand is to survive without intolerable civil tensions, the need is for a more decentralised political economy but not as decentralised as the Rogernomes envisaged. There are key elements of the good life—such as education, health and welfare – which cannot be delivered at the local level. But more can be delivered than currently. Working out what has to be done is not easy for at least two reasons.

First, New Zealand has political culture of majoritarianism. Even neoliberals when they get into power seize the levers rather than devolve them. For instance the ACT Treaty Principles Bill is a majoritarian solution in that the effect of the proposed referendum would be for the majority to impose a particular (ahistorical) interpretation of Te Tiriti. (Conversely, one is amused how politicians who lose power start advocating decentralisation, despite their having been centralisers when they were cabinet ministers.)

Second, a working decentralisation requires a ‘fair’ income distribution which can probably only be attained by centralist interventions. For instance, while greater local autonomy may be a key element, that local authorities depend upon rates as their main source of revenue makes effective autonomy impracticable. The same applies to individuals who without income lack autonomy.

Any shift towards greater decentralisation could be structured around treating Te Tiriti as a social contract, as it appears to have been be envisaged by at least one drafter (Busby). It leaves governance to the Crown, but the maximum self-determination/autonomy (rangatiratanga) to individuals. There is an obvious tension here but it rules out majoritarianism.

I’ll leave the details of the implementation to another venue. (Personally, I favour an incremental, organic approach. I have long supported increasing the autonomy of local authorities; this does not address Māori ‘nationalism’ concerns though.)

I need to say something about the role of Iwi. Strictly, the effect of Te Tiriti was to preserve rangatiratanga for the collective Iwi, rather than the individual Māori – that is the way they thought and were organised at the time.

The treaty settlement process has recognised this. While it strengthened Iwi financially, and hence politically, the Iwi are still not strong enough to affect the welfare of most of its members materially. I looked at the accounts of the first Iwi to settle and one of the largest and strongest (Tainui) and found that while it had enough income for its elite and governance (in this case the Kingitanga) and to support its various marae, there was little left for a dividend to its membership.

Every Iwi faces the challenge of sustaining active membership given that most of its members live outside the rohe and have multiple Iwi memberships, while their Māori ancestry is increasingly diluted. I’ll stop there except to say that my guess is that while Iwi have an important role in the evolution of Māori nationalism it may not be as central as they hope. The centre is likely to continue to have a greater influence on the wellbeing of Māori.